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I. HIRING

A.

State of Floridaas Employment Agency

Who would have guessed that the State of Florida would take out a help
wanted advertisement for exotic dancers? Exhibitionists willing to relocate
to Stuart and dance at a nightclub were urged to send a r~sum6 to the
Department of Labor/Bureau of Workforce Program Support, according to
an article in the Miami Herald.I Under federal law, before an employer is
entitled to hire someone from another country, the employer must make a
1.

John Pacenti, Strippers Wanted: State Runs Unusual Employment Ad, MIAMI

HERALD, Apr. 16, 1999, at 5B.
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finding that no Floridian is suitable for the job.2 If the efforts of the Florida
Department of Labor are unavailing, the strip club's application goes to the
United States Department of Labor, which decides whether to approve
certification for a work visa.3 If given the green light, only then, can the club
request that the Immigration and Naturalization Service approve a foreign
employee.4
B.

NegligentHiring

A school in Davie, Florida is being sued for failing to run a criminal
background check on a volunteer who turned out to be a convicted
pedophile. According to reports the Miami Herald,the school was unaware
of the volunteer's criminal record.6 Similar charges had been raised against
the same volunteer at a public school program for autistic children. The
School Board noted that its own policy only requires those "who work one
on one, unsupervised with children to be fingerprinted." Florida law
requires public school teachers to be fingerprinted in order to run
background checks. 9 If fingerprint tracing reveals that a teacher has been
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, the teacher
0 must be removed
from any position involving direct contact with students.'
While many employment checks now include a routine review of
criminal records compiled by the National Crime Information Center, an
employer's failure to check up on applicants does not invariably reflect gross
negligence.11 As a practical matter, employers are advised to conduct background investigations as a strategy for averting liability stemming from
negligent hiring. Liability
under Title 42 of the United States Code § 1983,
12
The Civil Rights Act, may lie only upon the exercise of some governmental
policy.' 3 Liability does not rest wholly on a showing
of a master-servant
relationship, also known as respondeat superior.14
2.

Id.

3.

Id.

4.

Id.

5.

Shari Rudavsky, FamiliesSue Man Accused of Sex Abuse Suits: Davie School,
Nova Negligent, MAMI HERAm. (Broward), May 7, 1999, at 1A.
6.
Id.
7.
Id.
8.

Id.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

FLA. STAT. § 231.02(2)(a) (1999).
Id.
Stokes v. Bullins, 844 F.2d 269, 275 (5th Cir. 1988).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 168 (6th Cir. 1985).
Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1385 (4th Cir. 1987).
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II. HOURS AND WAGES
A.

FairLabor StandardsAct
1. Constitutionality of FLSA Extension to Public Sector

Under the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution,
federal courts lack jurisdiction over suits by individuals against states for16
violating federal law.15 However, in 1996, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
the Supreme Court ruled that the Eleventh Amendment bars Congress from
subjecting states to suits in federal court for violating acts of Congress
passed pursuant to its powers under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.17 The Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 8 enacted under the Commerce Clause, authorizes federal court suits by state employees.' 9 Since
Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh Circuit, among other courts, has ruled that it
lacks jurisdiction over state employees' FLSA claims against a state. 20
In1999 the Supreme Court ruled that states have sovereign immunity in
state courts similar to their Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal
courts. 21 In 1992, ninety-six state probation and parole officers sued the
State of Maine in federal court for violating the FLSA by not giving them
premium pay for overtime.2 In light of Seminole Tribe, the workers' suit
was dismissed, and the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
dismissal. 23 The public employees then turned to the Maine courts for
relief.24 The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed the judgment of the
Superior Court of Cumberland County, deciding that the State enjoyed
sovereign immunity in its own courts, and likewise dismissed the suit. The

15. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment recites: 'The Judicial power
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State." Id.
16. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).

17.

Id. at 44.

18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994 & Supp. 1I 1997 & Supp. 1998).
19. Id. § 202.
20. Powell v. Florida, 132 F.3d 677, 678 (lth Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct.
2297 (1998).
21. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 2263-68 (1999).
22. Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37,41 (st Cir. 1997).
23. Id. at 40-41.
24. Alden v. State, 715 A.2d 172 (Me. 1998), cert. granted,Alden v. Maine, 119 S.
Ct. 443 (1998), af'd, Alden v. Maine, 119 S.Ct. 2240 (1999).
25. Id. at 175-76.
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Supreme Court of the United States agreed with the lower courts and
affirmed.Justice Kennedy's opinion for the majority in Alden v. Maine27 stated
that the Eleventh Amendment did not govern the case.2 At the same time,
he made clear the principle that state immunity "is demarcated not by the
text of the Amendment alone but by fundamental postulates implicit in the
constitutional design., 29 In his dissent, Justice Souter warned that 4.7
million state employees were now barred from suing their employer in both
state and federal court.30 Although the federal government can still sue in
state court, the labor department is ill equipped to take up the slack left by
Seminole Tribe and Alden.
2. Minimum Wage Issues
Thousands of Haitian migrants earned less than $100 for up to sixtyhour workweeks, picking beans in the vegetable fields of South Dade
County.31 According to an article in the Miami Herald, many of these
farmworkers hope to convince a federal court judge in Miami that they are
owed three million dollars in back minimum wages. 2 Six hundred twelve
workers filed a class action suit in 1990, but their case is only now being
heard.33- The farmers contend that they did provide minimum-wage
payments to contractors, who then paid the workers less than minimum
wage. In depositions, the contractors conceded that they never kept any
records.35 In 1996 the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the growers not the labor

contractors, were the actual employers of the migrant workers.~ As a result,

the farmers bear the burden of obeying federal wage and hour laws.37 The
case could take a year to reach a decision. 8

26.

Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240,2269 (1999).

27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 2240.
Id. at 2254.
Id. at 2243.
Id. at 2293 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing State Government Employment Data:

March 1997 (visited Oct. 6, 1999) <http:llwww.census.gov/pub/govs/apes/97stus.txt>).
31. David Lyons, Migrant Workers Take Wage Dispute to Court, MIAMI HERALD,
Feb. 14, 1999, at lB.

32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

36.
37.

Lyons, supra note 31, at lB.
Id.

38. Id.
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The Miami-Dade County Commission voted twelve to zero on May 11,
1999 to enact a "living wage" ordinance, requiring Miami-Dade County, and
companies that furnish services to the County, to pay employees at least
$8.56 per hour with health benefits, according to a report in the Miami
Herald.39 The ordinance will raise the salaries of 1760 full-time and parttime public employees working for the county. 4° The law, to be phased in
over several years, becomes fully effective in October, 2002.41 Miami-Dade
joins twenty-six other cities across the nation that have adopted similar
laws.42
President Clinton has proposed raising the minimum wage by one
dollar, to $6.15, by September, 2000. 4 3 Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan
Greenspan, opposes the increase. 44 The pros and cons of such an increase
were debated recently in the Miami Herald.
3. Independent Contractors v. Employees
FLSA, the Act governing minimum wage and overtime pay, was
amended by Congress in 1974 to cover the vast majority of state and local
government employees. 46 In Brouwer v. Metropolitan Dade County,47 a
juror alleged that failure to compensate jurors for jury duty amounted to a
FLSA violation. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the suit, ruling that there
is no employment relationship between a juror and the county. 49 The circuit
court applied the "economic reality" test to determine whether an
employment relationship existed. 0 Moreover, the court made clear that the
issue of employment status under the FLSA is a question of law.5 Miami-

39.

Don Finefrock, Living Wage is Approved for Dade, MIAMI HERALD, May 12, 1999,

at lB.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Jared Bernstein, Raise the Minimum Wage? Working Poor Will Benefit, MIAMI
HERALD, May 10, 1999, at 15A.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).
47. 139 F.3d 817 (llth Cir. 1998).
48. Id. at 818.
49. Id. at 819.
50. Id. (citing Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 31-33 (1961);
Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms, 20 F.3d 434,439 (1 lth Cir. 1994)).
51. Brouwer, 139 F.3d at 818 (citing Villarreal v. Woodham, 113 F.3d 202, 205 ( l1th
Cir.1997)).
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Dade County clearly falls within the FLSA's definition of public employer.52
The court cited an array of differences between public employees and jurors,
including the following: 1) jurors are selected involuntarily from voter
registration lists; 2) jurors enjoy no sick or annual leave, nor job security,
nor social security or pension benefits; 3) jurors do not voluntarily give their
labor to the state, but are forced to serve; 4) jurors are not paid a salary,
instead, they are entitled to a statutorily set sum no matter how many hours
they serve; and 5) the state lacks the5 power to fire jurors for poor
performance, but must accept their verdict. 3
4. FLSA Exemption Section 13(a)(1) Exemption for Executive,
Administrative, and Professional Workers
Section 13(a)(1) of the FLSA carves out a minimum wage and overtime
pay exemption for any employee working "IN A BONA FIDE EXECUTIVE, ADMINISTRATIVE, OR PROFESSIONAL CAPACITY." 4 The
basic test for measuring whether an employee is salaried is found at 29
C.F.R. § 541.118(a). 55 Under this Department of Labor regulation,
[an employee will be considered to be paid "on a salary basis"
...if under his employment agreement he regularly receives each
pay period on a weekly, or less frequent basis, a predetermined
amount constituting all or part of his compensation, which amount
is not subject to reduction because of variations in the quality or
quantity of the work performed. 6
There was a split among the circuit courts over whether dockin must
have actually occurred, or whether mere potential was enough.
The
Supreme Court settled the issue in Auer v. Robbins5 8 in 1997.59 Auer upheld
the Secretary of Labor's regulation in 29 C.F.R. § 541.118, making clear that
public employees, to win exemption from overtime pay, must not face salar
reductions because of variations in quantity or quality of work performed.
However, Auer left several loose ends, but the Supreme Court recently
52.
53.
54.
55.

29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1994 & Supp. HI 1997).
Brouwer, 139 F.3d at 819.
29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1).
29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a).

56.
58.
59.

Id.
See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452,460 (1997).
Id.
Id. at 452.

60.

Id. at 463-64.

57.
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denied certiorari in Davis v. City of Hollywood,61 an Eleventh Circuit case
arising in Florida.62 Davis raised the question whether the "window of
correction" spelled out in regulations covering deductions made
inadvertently would be lost, even if the employer reimbursed
the employee
63
for such deductions and promised to comply in the future.
5. Prohibited Employer Acts Under the FLSA
FLSA makes it unlawful for any person to deal in any manner with
goods which were produced by employees whose pay did not conform with
the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Act,64 or to violate the
minimum wage and overtime rules themselves. 65 Tyler v. State66 raised the
question whether this provision of the FLSA is violated when an employee67is
denied the right to prove his case of fraudulent denial of overtime in court.
B.

Equal Pay Act

The Equal Pay Act of 1963 ("EPA") 6 8 aimed at ensuring that employees
doing equal work should be paid equal wages, regardless of sex. 69 In 1999,
Congress took up a bill, the Paycheck Fairness Act, 70 designed to strengthen
the FLSA by allowing for compensatory and punitive damages and putting
gender based wage bias on an equal footing with race or ethnicity based
wage discrimination. 7 1 The proposed bill would also prohibit employers
from punishing workers for sharing salary information with their
coworkers. 72 Moreover, Congress is considering reintroducing the Fair Pay
Act 73 aimed at barring pay 74bias on grounds of sex, race, or national origin for
work in "equivalent" jobs.
61. 120 F.3d 1178 (1lth Cir. 1997), cert. denied, Davis v. City of Hollywood, 118 S.
Ct. 1827 (1998).
62. Id. at 1178.
63. Id. at 1180.
64. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
65. Id. § 215(a)(2).
66. 718 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997), cert. denied, Tyler v. Chiles, 119 S.
Ct. 340 (1998).
67. Id. at 812.
68. Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963) (prior to amendment).
69. Id.
70. S. 74, 106th Cong. (1999).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. H.R. 1271, 106th Cong. (1999).
74. Id.
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III. INVASION OF PRIVACY

A.

Public Employee Drug Testing

In Cox v. McCraley,75 Cox worked for the Osceola County School
Board as a lead painter.76 After working there for eleven years, Cox received
a letter from his supervisor, Whitman, stating "that he had a 'reasonable
suspicion' that Cox had violated School Board policy regarding drug and/or
alcohol abuse."
Three options were offered to Cox: 1) undergo drug
testing; 2) _oin an employee assistance program; or 3) hand in his
resignation. When Cox elected to take the drug screening test, he was told
that this option had been mistakenly included, and that it was no longer
available.75 Although Cox completed his annual contract, he was not
reappointed.80
Cox filed a grievance, and after conducting a full evidentiary hearing,
the School Board ruled "that there was no reasonable suspicion of drug use
by Cox ..... 81 At the same time, the Board made clear that it was powerless
to change the decision not to reappoint Cox.8 2 Cox appealed the Board's
ruling to Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal, which sustained the
Board's decision. 3
In his lawsuit in federal district court, Cox claimed that the defendants
committed an "unwarranted invasion of [his] fundamental right to
privacy .... ,, 4 Cox sued under § 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code,
claiming violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution.85 Cox also invoked the corresponding sections
of the Florida Constitution, and a claim 86for intentional infliction of
emotional distress under Florida common law.
In its opinion, the federal district court agreed that Cox was entitled to
rely on § 1983 to raise violations of his Fourth Amendment right to privacy
75.
76.

993 F. Supp. 1452 (M.D. Fla. 1998).
Id. at 1454.

77.
78.

Id.

80.

Cox, 993 F. Supp. at 1454.

81.

Id. at 1454-55.
Id. at 1455.

Id.
79. Id.
82.

83. Cox v. School Bd. of Osceola County, 669 So. 2d 353, 356 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1996).

84. Cox, 993 F. Supp. at 1455 (alteration in original) (citing Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
85. Id.
86. Id.
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and his Fifth Amendment right to procedural due process. s 7 However,
before a city is liable under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege municipal
liability based upon an officially promulgated policy or an unofficially
adopted custom. 8 Cox's claim of a municipal policy, the letter Whitman
wrote to Cox raising a suspicion of drug or alcohol abuse, establishes, at
most, a89 claim that such is an unofficially adopted custom of the School
Board. Custom will support municipal liabilityonly if it isso entrenched
and long standing that it carries the force of law. The federal district court
concluded that Cox failed to state a claim against the School Board under §
1983.91 Assuming arguendo, that Cox had stated a § 1983 claim, his privacy
claim under the Fourth Amendment was unavailing. 92 Cox fell short of
alleging that anything "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" was at
stake. 9
Cox's due process claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments suffer the same fate; absent a property interest in
reappointment, no procedural due process violation took place.94 Even so,
the Board offered Cox a full evidentiary hearing.95
Turning to Cox's federal claims against his former supervisors in their
individual capacity, the court made clear that Cox failed to prove that the
defendants acted under color of state law to deprive Cox of a right conferred
by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. 96 The court concluded
that "government officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to
qualified immunity from civil damages if their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known."9 The court ruled that Cox's supervisors "were
acting within the scope of their authority and did not violate any clearly
established law of which a reasonable person would have known. ' 98 Cox's
complaint was dismissed with prejudice. 99 In addition,
1°° the court declined
supplemental jurisdiction over Cox's state law claims.

87.

Id.

88.

Id. (citing Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978)).

89.
90.
91.

Cox, 993 F. Supp. at 1456.
Id. (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988)).
Cox, 993 F. Supp. at 1456.

92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Cox, 993 F. Supp. at 1457.
Id. (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

Id.
Id. at 1457-58.
Id. at 1458.
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FalseLight Invasion of Privacy

Apart from constitutional protection of privacy found either in the
Fourth Amendment or in the penumbras the Bill of Rights, privacy founded
on state constitutions, statutes, and common law has been invoked by public
employees as a separate cause of action sounding in tort. 101 To state a claim
of tortious invasion of privacy, the intrusion must be unreasonable or
offensive and must outweigh the employer's need to pry.1°2 Claims of
invasion of privacy committed by public employers are
103 often defeated either
by statutory or common law public official immunity.
In Harris v. District Board of Trustees,1°4 coordinators of a criminal
justice program run by a community college sued for invasion of privacy
after they lost their jobs.' °s The court sustained the former public
employees' claim that the community college had presented the workers in a
false light. 10 6 Similarly, the Miami Herald recently reported on a case
involving public employment and invasion of privacy. 107 Andrew Greene
ran against School Board member Miriam Oliphant in 1992, but Greene's
prospects dimmed amid news reports that he had received counseling for
psychological problems. 0 8 In 1997 a jury awarded Greene $600,000 for
invasion of privacy and $250,000 for negligence.' 9 The Fourth District
Court of Appeal handed down an opinion in June, 1999 affirming the jury's
award of $850,000 to the former School Board candidate.110 The jury agreed
with the former teacher that his employer had no right to release Greene's
confidential psychological records to the news media without his consent."1
At the same time, state law limits claims against public entities to $100,000

101.
102.
103.
104.

See Harris v. District Bd. of Trustees, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1319 (M.D. Fla. 1998).
See id. at 1329.
See id.
9 F. Supp. 2d 1319 (M.D. Fa. 1998).

105. Id. at 1322.
106. Id. at 1329.
107. Daniel de Vise, Judgment Against Schools Upheld Candidate's Files Leaked to
Media, MmAI HEA (Broward), June 19, 1999, at 3B.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. (citing School Bd. of Broward County v. Greene, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1392
(4th Dist. Ct. App. June 16, 1999) (the opinion cited in the article was later withdrawn and
supersededon denial of reh'g by School Bd. of Broward County v. Greene, 739 So. 2d 668
(4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999)).
111. Id.
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for negligence. 12 It is up to the state legislature to approve any higher sum,
3
which seems unlikely."
IV. RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

Under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, no
person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself."' " 4 This ban on compelled testimony covers evidence that might be
admissible against a public employee in a criminal proceeding. 115 A public
employee who confesses to self-incriminating evidence of criminal behavior
when threatened with dismissal from employment may invoke the privilege
in defense. 16 The privilege may not be invoked, however, when
7 the
compelled testimony will not be relied upon in a criminal proceeding."
In United States v. Veal," s Veal, Camacho and other police officers,
were members of the Street Narcotics Unit ("SNU") of the Miami Police
Department. 19 The Chief of Police received a letter in which an anonymous
informant warned that unidentified drug dealers had met at Seventh Avenue
and N.W. Thirty-Second Street, in Miami and had contracted to kill
Camacho. 12 The police knew this address was the home of Mercado, a drug
dealer.
On their way to a sting operation, Veal and other SNU members
stopped at Mercado's house, approached Mercado, who was outside, and led
him into his house.122 Soon, police cars and a fire rescue unit arrived in
response to calls for assistance from Camacho.1'3 Despite emergency
medical efforts, Mercado died at the scene. 24 Pictures taken of Camacho
once he returned to the police station showed a long rip in the front of
Camacho's shirt.'2 These pictures, plus a butcher knife (allegedly retrieved
from the crime scene) and a bag of crack cocaine (allegedly seized from
Mercado) were placed in the lieutenant's cabinet.1 26
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

De Vise, supra note 107, at 3B (referring to FLA. STAT. § 768.28 (1999)).
Id.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
See id.
Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967).
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422,438-39 (1956).
153 F.3d 1233 (1lth Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 2024 (1999).
Id. at 1236.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Veal, 153 F.3d at 1236.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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A Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBr') investigation led to federal
civil rights charges against Camacho, Veal and other police officers for
violating Mercado's civil rights. 27 The district judge found the statements
concerning the circumstances of Mercado's death within the scope of
Garrity v. New Jersey,1 2 and granted the officers' motion to suppress the
statements.1 29 The officers were acquitted of conspiracy in the civil rights
trial, and the jury deadlocked on the other charges. 130 In July of 1993 a
federal grand jury in South Florida indicted Camacho, Veal, and two other
police officers for conspiring to obstruct justice, for perjury, and for giving
false statements. 131 The defendants once again moved to suppress their
statements, which had been suppressed under Garrity in the civil rights
trial.132 The judge denied those motions,
1 33and both Camacho and Veal were
convicted and received prison sentences.
On appeal, Veal challenged the district court's refusal to suppress their
statements after Mercado's death, since the same judge had suppressed those
statements under Garrity in the civil rights trial. 1 4 In Garrity,the Supreme
Court made clear that the Fifth Amendment applies to police officers facing
interrogation by other law enforcement officers and that "incriminating
statements made under threat of termination for remaining silent are
inadmissible in a subsequent criminal prosecution concerning the matter of
inquiry absent a knowing and voluntary waiver."' 35
The Eleventh Circuit ultimately ruled that Garrity and the Fifth
Amendment do not protect false statements from subsequent prosecutions:
When an accused has been accorded immunity to preserve his right
against self-incrimination, he must choose either to relinquish his
Fifth Amendment right and testify truthfully, knowing that his
statements cannot be used against him in a subsequent criminal
prosecution regarding the matter being investigated, or continue to
assert the privilege and suffer the consequences. There is no third
option for testifying falsely without
incurring potential prosecution
136
for perjury or false statements.

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 1238.
385 U.S. 493 (1967).
Veal, 153 F.3d at 1238.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Veal, 153 F.3d at 1238-39.
Id. at 1239 (citing Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967)).
Id. at 1241.
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V. FRAUD CASES TIED TO DOWNSIZING

In July of 1999 a supervisory claims examiner for the Department of
Veterans Affairs ("VA") in Florida, who stole $615,451 by writing up a false
claim in her fianc6's name, was sentenced to thirty-three months in prison,
according to a news report in the Washington Post. 37 Investigators say Joy
Cheri Brown, a supervisory claims examiner for the VA, falsely granted a
100% disability claim to her fianc6, a St. Petersburg police officer, who had
served in the military during Desert Storm.138 By the time the scheme was
detected, Brown had granted her fianc6 payments totaling $519,981, and
awarded him a $5011 monthly payment for a fake injury.13 The inspector
general for the VA attributed the fraud to staff reductions that left the VA
more vulnerable; the VA's benefits staff has been cut by twenty percent
since 1993.14° The VA's inspector
general referred to the case as "the
141
dangers inherent in downsizing.
VI. REGULATION OF OFF-DUTY BEHAVIOR
At times, the public employer may fairly stake a claim in the off-duty
behavior of its employees to achieve a smoothly running agency or to
preserve its image of integrity and honesty.142 Arguably, the employer's
stake is greatest when crimes are committed while the public employee is
off-duty.143 For example, in Castilleja v. City of Jacksonville,144 while offduty and in his own car, Castilleja, a Jacksonville police officer, hit and
damaged a fence and sign at a trailer park, and left the scene without
reporting the incident to the authorities.' 45 Additionally, he did not leave the
statutorily mandated information with the trailer park management or
owners.
The next day, an eyewitness reported Castilleja's tag number to
the police. 147 Although he initially lied, Castilleja eventually came clean and

137. Bill McAllister, Fraud Cases Wony VA IG; Report on Convictions Cites a Down
Side to Downsizing, WASH. POST, July 20, 1999, at A17.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See Castilleja v. City of Jacksonville, 738 So. 2d 335 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1998).
143. See id.
144. 738 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
145. Id. at 335.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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admitted his role in the accident. 1' s For this, Castilleja received two
noncriminal traffic citations: one for 1leaving
the scene without leaving
49
information, and one for careless driving.
As a result of this incident, Castilleja received "notice of immediate
suspension with termination to follow."5
After a plenary evidentiary
hearing, the Jacksonville Civil Service Board ruled that the punishment was
at odds with the City's charter and that it was manifestly unjust.1 5' On
appeal, the circuit court reversed the Board's ruling as unsupported by
competent substantial evidence.152 On appeal, Castilleja claimed that the
lower court had improperly reweighed the evidence and substituted its
judgment for the Board's. 1 53 The court of appeal agreed1 4 The lower
court's scope of review was confined to: 1) whether the Board afforded due
process; 2) whether the basic tenets of the law were observed; and 3)
whether the Board's findings of fact and conclusions of law were grounded
in competent substantial evidence. 55 The First District Court of Appeal
concluded that the circuit court failed to determine whether the Board's
rulings were supported by competent substantial evidence, and instead
reviewed the record to see if the Sheriff's decision was supported by
competent substantial evidence. 56 The circuit court erroneously sat as a new
Board and reweighed the evidence in the case. 157 As for Castilleja's request
for backpay, the court of appeal ruled that his request for postponement
58
should not result in his employer having to pay for time he did not work.
An article in the Miami Herald reported on a moonlighting case
involving a Hollywood police officer that was caught working an off-duty
security job during his regular patrol shift.159 As punishment, the officer was
suspended for six months from performing twenty dollars an hour
moonlighting assignments and his eligibility for promotion or transfer was
withdrawn for one year1 6° The officer was cleared of criminal wrongdoing,

148. Id. at 335-36.
149. Castilleja,738 So. 2d at 336.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Castilleja,738 So. 2d at 336.
155. Id. (citing Haines City Community Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 1995)).
156. Id.
157. Id.
at 337.
158. Id.
159. D. Aileen Dodd, Hollywood Officer Under Investigation: Violations of Off-Duty
WorkPolicy Probed,MIAMu HEAI (Broward), Dec. 3, 1998, at lB.
160. Id.
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however. 161 The Hollywood Police Department conducted a probe into offduty jobs after the Miami Herald ran its own investigation into the
practice. 162 The newspaper's probe yielded many examples in which officers
were scheduled to be in two places at once.1 63 Hollywood's off-duty policy
was run as a "buddy-buddy" or "clique" system often at the cost of offending
minorities and female officers. 164 The report recommended that the Department assign off-duty work through a rotation system. 65 Before any changes
can occur, however, the City must bargain with the police union
over the
66
issue, and the union is known to be hostile to a rotation system.
VII. FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT
Under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 167 all eligible
state and local government employees are entitled to twelve weeks of unpaid
leave in a twelve month period: 1) for birth or adoption of a child or
placement of a foster child; 2) to care for a spouse, child or parent with a
serious health condition; or 3) for the employee's own serious health
condition. 68 Leaves taken in response to a "serious health condition"
include time laid up in a hospital, hospice or residential medical care
facility. 169
170
In Wright v. Department of Children & Families, Wright, a former
employee of the Department of Children and Families, was unexpectedly
absent from work.1 r His illnesses included an abscessed tooth, gastritis,
hepatitis A, bronchitis, and acute arthritis." 2 Wright notified his supervisor
1 73
of his illnesses and furnished medical certification for these absences.
Wright was disciplined for his use of approved leave. 74 Wright argued that

161. Corey Dade, Officer's Off-Duty Job While On Duty No Crime: PolicemanMay Still
FaceAction, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Jan. 28, 1999, at IA.
162. Id.
163. Corey Dade, Fix Off-Duty Work Policy, Cops Advised, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
Dec. 11, 1998, at lB.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (1994).
168. Id. § 2612.
169. 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(1) (1998).
170. 712 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
171. Id. at 831.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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the Department's imposition
of discipline for the use of approved sick leave
75
violated the FMLA.
Wright worked in a health care facility with a skeleton staff.1 76 Among
his daily duties, Wright had to bathe, change, dress, and feed special needs
patients. 177 Wright's absences forced the agency to assign scarce staff to fill
the gap. 178 For this reason, Wright's absences undermined the Department's
ability to furnish adequate health care services to patients. 79 The Third
District Court of Appeal concluded that the
Department had cause to
80
discipline Wright for excessive absenteeism.1
Under the FMLA, an employee who seeks leave for medical reasons
must establish that he suffers from a "serious health condition. 1 8 ' The
FMLA defines this term to cover an illness that involves inpatient care at a
medical facility or "continuing treatment by a health care provider."' 82 The
Third District Court of Appeal concluded that Wright did not establish that
he sustained a qualifying "serious health condition" as required by the
FMLA. 1 3 The court ruled that the hearing officer's findings of fact were
grounded upon competent, substantial evidence.1
The question has been raised whether FMLA suits against state
employers may be brought in federal courts. 8 5 In Driesse v. FloridaBoard
of Regents,1 6 the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida ruled that FMLA suits against state employers in federal court
7 are
barred by the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution.'
VIII. WORKERS' COMPENSATION

A.

Tort Actions and Exclusivity

Employers originally agreed to no-fault liability under workers' compensation statutes in exchange for immunity from tort liability for injuries or

175. Wright, 712 So. 2d at 831.
176. Id. at 832.

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Wright, 712 So. 2d at 832.
29 U.S.C. § 2611(11) (1994).
Id. § 2611(11)(a), (1).
Wright, 712 So. 2d at 832.
Id.
See Driesse v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (M.D. Fla. 1998).
26 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (M.D. Fla. 1998).
Id. at 1331.
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diseases that employees suffer in the course of their employment. 18 Like
every other jurisdiction, Florida's workers' compensation
statute preempts
89
state tort claims covered by workers' compensation.1
In Dade County School Board v. Laing,190 Ronald Laing was involved
in an incident while he was working as a teacher at Hialeah High School. 9'
As he was leaving a classroom, a golf cart driven by the school custodian,
Joe Rodriguez, hit him. 92 At Hialeah High, custodians and security guards
drive golf carts to cross the school grounds.193 After his injury, Laing
applied for, and was granted, workers' compensation benefits. 94 All the
same, Laing also brought a personal injury lawsuit against the School
Board.' 95 The question for the Fourth District Court of Appeal was whether
the exclusivity provision96 of the workers' compensation statute precluded
Laing's state tort claim.1
Whether Laing could sue the School Board in tort turned on whether he
was involved in "unrelated works" when the accident occurred.'9 If he was,
then workers' compensation did not preclude his state tort claim against the
School Board. 98 Section 440.11(1) of the Florida Statutes carves out an
exception to workers' compensation immunity when employees are
"operating in the furtherance of the employer's business but they are
assigned primarily to unrelated works within private or public employment."1 99 Laing claimed that, because his job as a teacher and Rodriguez's
role as a custodian were "unrelated,"
the exception is triggered, thus piercing
2
the School Board's immunity. 00
Whether an employee is involved in "unrelated works" turns on the
following factor as framed by the court: "[W]hether the co-employees are
involved in different projects," and "[t]hus, the focus is upon the nature of
the project involved,
as opposed to the specific work skills of individual
20 1
employees."
188. See United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149 (1966).
189. FLA. STAT. § 440.11 (1999). However, immunity from suit for governmental

employees flows from FLA. STAT. § 768.28(9)(1) (1999).
190. 731 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
191. Id. at 20.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Laing, 731 So. 2d at 20.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. FLA. STAT. § 440.11(1) (1999).
200. Laing, 731 So. 2d at 20.
201. Id. (citing Vause v. Bay Med. Ctr., 687 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996);
Abraham v. Dzafic, 666 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995)).
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The trial court found that the teacher and custodian were engaged in
"unrelated works" when the accident occurred and thus, Laing's tort claim
against the School Board could proceed.2
2
The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court.2 3 The court
reasoned that just because employees perform different duties it does not
invariably mean that they are involved in "unrelated works." 2 4 The court
concluded that the teacher and custodian were co-employees undertaking
education related services for students at school when the accident
occurred. 2 0 5 Both were part of a team in promoting education at the
school. & As a result, the teacher and custodian were not engaged in
"unrelated works" and, therefore, the teacher's state tort claim wasorecluded
by the exclusivity provision of the workers' compensation statute.
B.

InjuriesArisingfrom Employee Misconduct

An alternate route around the exclusivity provision of workers'
compensation is to show that injuries sustained stemmed from the intentional
misconduct of a co-employee.
For example, in Castellano v. Raynor, °
Gina Castellano worked as a secretary at Graham Elementary School.210 On
January 27, 1995, Mark Raynor, a physical education teacher also employed
at the school, tossed a football at Castellano, causing injuries. 2
As
employees of the Hillsborough County School Board, both employees were
immune from suit unless they acted "'in bad faith or with malicious purpose,
or in a manner exhibiting a willful and wanton disregard of human rights,
safety, or property.' '' 212
Here, Castellano and Raynor were friends and coworkers.213 On the day
in question, Raynor was waiting for his next class to assemble on the
football field and absent-mindedly tossed a football to some students who
passed by.214 Raynor saw Castellano leaving a building, called her name,
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. (citing Johnson v. Comet Steel Erection, Inc., 435 So. 2d 908, 909 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1983)).
205. Laing, 731 So. 2d at 20.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See Castellano v. Raynor, 725 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
209. 725 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
210. Id. at 1198.
211. Id.
212. Id.
(quoting FLA. STAT. § 768.28(9)(a) (1999)).
213. Id
214. Castellano, 725 So. 2d at 1198.
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and threw the ball "underhanded in a slow arc toward her for her to6
'
Inadvertently, the ball hit Castellano in the jaw and upper chest.2
catch. ' 215
Raynor immediately apologized, especially when he afterwards noticed that
Castellano was carrying student files.2 17 Although Raynor knew Castellano
had jaw problems, no evidence shows that Raynor intentionally tossed the
ball at her head.21 8 Apparently, Castellano detected no ill will, iven that she
applied for and was awarded workers' compensation benefits. 1
The trial court ruled that Raynor was immune from suit and the Second
District Court of Appeal affirmed. 2 In support of this conclusion, the
district court cited the holding in Castro v. Allstate Insurance Co.,22 '
wherein a police officer playfully tickled another officer's ear with the
antenna of his hand-held radio, and the second officer abruptly and
unexpectedly turned his head, forcing the antenna into his ear canal and
rupturing his ear drum. 22 The Third District Court of Appeal found no
evidence of intent to injure the second officer and reversed the lower court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of the first officer's homeowner's
insurance company, which had tried to characterize the injury as
intentional. 223 Similarly, in this case, Raynor's culpability, at most, rises to
the level of
224negligence, far below the level of culpability needed to make
him liable.
C.

Relation of Injury to Employment

Workers' compensation benefits are awarded only for injuries or
diseases arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of
employment.2
While workers' compensation statutes are liberally construed in favor of compensating the injured, some accidents that take place
while the public employee is off-duty are too remote for coverage under the
law.2 26 For example, in City of North Bay Village v. Millerick,2 an off-duty
215. Id.

216. Id. at 1199.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id.
Id.
Castellano, 725 So. 2d at 1199.
Id.

221. 724 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
222. Id. at 134.
223. Id. at 135.
224. Castelano,725 So. 2d at 1199.
225. FLA. STAT. § 440.091 (1999).

226. See City of North Bay Village v. Millerick, 721 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1998), review denied, 733 So. 2d 516 (1999).

227. 721 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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police sergeant, Millerick, was drinking at the Polo Club, a bar in North
Miami Beach, at 5:00 a.m. when he struck up a conversation with Billy
Martino, a man suspected to be involved in selling illegal drugs22 3 They
ended up fighting, but Millerick left after Martino shouted to other bar
patrons that Millerick was a police officer.229 Later, in the parking lot, two
men accosted Millerick, but Millerick was able to escape in his car.
While
driving toward North Bay Village, Millerick sensed the two men in their car
were following him.23 As he sped away, Millerick lost control of his car,
crossed over the median into oncoming traffic and collided with a car
232
traveling in the opposite direction.33 The driver of the other car died, and
Millerick was grievously injured.
While Millerick admitted that he had been drinking throughout the
evening of the accident, he denied that he was drunk.23 4 Millerick applied
for workers' compensation benefits, but the case went unresolved for six
years after the initial hearing on the issue of coverage..25 Finally, on
February 17, 1998, the Judge of Compensation Claims awarded Millerick
disability benefits." In support of this award, the judge ruled that Millerick
had been engaged in his primary duty as a police officer when he was
injured. 37 Florida has a special rule governing police officers' actions when
it comes to scope of employment.2 38 "[A] police officer who was discharging a primary law enforcement responsibility 'shall be deemed to have been
acting in the course of employment' regardless of the officer's duty status at
the time."23 9 However, evidence that a police officer was prepared to
discharge a law enforcement duty falls short of ustifying an injury as arising
in the course of the officer's employment. h ° Here, the alleged law
enforcement nexus comes from the encounter between Millerick and
Martino.24 1 The First District Court of Appeal found that this encounter did
not arise from a desire to execute a legitimate law enforcement function;

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id. at 1230.
Id.
Id. at 1231.
Id.
Millerick, 721 So. 2d at 1231.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Millerick, 721 So. 2d at 1231.
Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 440.091 (1997)).
Id.

240. Id.
241. Id. at 1232.
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Millerick's injuries were sustained during a night of social drinking.242 This
aim was not altered because Millerick started arguing with a man who turned
out to be a potential suspect. 243 In sum, the bar fight did not take place
"under circumstances reasonably consistent" with the manner in which an
officer's primary responsibility would be performed. 244 Even more remote
was the nexus between the bar incident and the causeway accident. 245 These
two incidents may be wholly unrelated.2 46 The First District Court of Appeal
concluded that Millerick was not entitled to recover workers' compensation
benefits.2 47
D. Attorneys' Fees
In Volusia County Fire Services v. Eaby,248 Alan Eaby was working as a
paramedic when he was exposed to the hepatitis C virus during the scope
and course of employment. 9 The public employer conceded the condition
was a compensable, occupationally contracted disease 50 The employer later
admitted that Eaby was temporarily and totally disabled.251 Eaby sought
attorney's fees provided under workers' compensation law. 2 2 The Judge of
Compensation Claims granted attorney's fees, finding that the employer had
denied a requested benefit, namely permanent total disability benefits.25 3
Having denied a claim, the employer was bound to file a notice of denial. 54
Instead of'2investigating
the claim, the employer built a "wall of willful
55
ignorance.
On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal reversed the award of
attorney's fees. 56 According to the court, the employer is not bound to file a
notice of denial when it pays one of two alternative claims for indemnity
benefits made in a single petition. 7 The employer paid the temporary total
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Millerick 721 So. 2d at 1232.
Id.
Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 440.091(2) (1997)).
Id.
Id.
Millerick 721 So. 2d at 1232.
725 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
Id. at416.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 440.34(3)(b), .192(8) (1995)).
Eaby, 725 So. 2d at 417.
Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 440.192(8)).
Id.
Id. at 416.
Id. at 417.
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disability claim and rejected the claim for permanent total disability.2 Eaby
had not reached maximum medical improvement as of the date of the
petition for attorney's fees. 9
E.

Setoffs, Tie-ins with Other Statutes, and Disqualifications

In Heric v. City of Ormond Beach,2° William Heric worked as a city
firefighter.6 1 While on vacation, Heric suffered a heart attack.2 62 The
employer agreed to pay medical and indemnity benefits. 263 The governing
collective bargaining agreement addressed the issue of how benefits were to
be paid. 2& Under the agreement, claimants were entitled to recover full pay
and disability benefits for up to 1008 hours, which comes out to ninety days
for firefighters.2 5 In the event the cap is exhausted, claimants may seek an
extension of "full pay" status. M In the face of a petition, the city must
convene a panel, which makes a recommendation to the city manager who
bears ultimate authority over claimant's petition.267 If the petition is turned
down, the agreement makes clear that "[t]he employee shall, after utilizing
Sick Leave
the employee's annual Personal Leave Time and the employee's
''
Bank, revert to normal workers' compensation benefits. 68
Heric exhausted his 1008 hours, petitioned the city for a "full pay"
status extension, and received full pay through deductions from his sick and
personal leave banks until he returned to work on June 2, 1997. 269 At the
same time, Heric sought temporary total disability or temporary partial
disability benefits. 270 The hearing focused on whether Heric was entitled to
benefits for the period after he had exhausted his sick leave and personal
leave.271 The hearing judge denied benefits, citing the collective bargaining
agreement, which calls for binding arbitration of such claims as the sole
source for a remedyY 2 Florida law favors such alternative dispute
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Eaby, 725 So. 2d at 416.

Id.
728 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
Id. at 1247.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Heric,728 So. 2d at 1248.
Id.

267. Id.
268.
269.
270.
271.

Id.
Id.
Heric,728 So. 2d at 1248.
Id.

272. Id.
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resolution systems agreed upon by the parties for resolving workers'
compensation benefits disputes.
As long as the benefits themselves are
undiminished, private arbitration conforms to Florida law.274
On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal ruled that the judge's
finding, that the collective bargaining agreement did not diminish Heric's
right to workers' compensation benefits, was in error.275 According to the
court, Florida law leaves no doubt that the agreement is nonbinding if it tries
z 6
to regulate the method of recovering workers' compensation benefits. 7
Thus, the agreement undermined Heric's right to benefits by forcing him to
exhaust his personal and sick leave benefits before recovering workers'
compensation benefits. 7 7 On remand, the judge was instructed to hold a
hearing on the merits of Heric's claim for benefits for the period in
* 278
question.
At the same time, the court concluded that the employer may
seek to offset against the leave pay awarded to Heric the amount by which
the sum of leave pay and workers' compensation benefits exceeds Heric's
average weekly wage. 279 Similarly, the judge has discretion to reduce
Heric's sick leave and personal leave benefits by a fraction equivalent to the
offset accorded the employer.280

IX. HEALTH BENEFITS
Some states and many local subdivisions of the state provide dependent
health benefits to "spousal equivalents" of its public employees. These socalled "domestic partnership" laws meet with opposition on many
fronts. For example, on December 9, 1998 the South Florida Water
Management District postponed a vote to grant insurance benefits to
unmarried, partners of its employees in the face of protest by the Christian
The District would have been the first Florida agency to offer
Coalition.
domestic partnership benefits. 282 Governor Jeb Bush reportedly opposes

273. See FLA. STAT. § 440.211 (1999).
274. Id. § 440.211(2).
275. Heric, 728 So. 2d at 1249.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 1249-50.
279. Id. at 1250.
280. Heric, 728 So. 2d at 1250.
281. Lori Rozsa, District Puts Off Vote on PartnerBenefits, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 10,
1998, at 6B.
282. Id.
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granting benefits for unmarried partners. 3 One board member commented
that unelected public officials should not be setting social policy. 2
A month after Miami-Dade commissioners narrowly passed a human
rights ordinance, Broward Countybegan considering a sweeping domestic
partnership law in January, 1999.2s Besides offering insurance benefits to
domestic partners of county employees, the proposal required
independent
286
contractors doing business with the county to do the same.
Heterosexuals
living in unmarried partnerships would also qualify under the proposal. 28 7
Moreover, unmarried adults could extend their insurance benefits to an
elderly parent or other blood relative living in the same household.28 8 A
public hearing was set for January 26, 1999.2 9
An editorial in the Miami Herald endorsed the proposed domestic
partnership law, but noted that in order to avoid violating Florida's Defense
of Marriage Act,290 the proposal defined partnerships as two single people
who share expenses and consider themselves a family. 9 1 As the editorial
pointed out, this definition encompasses a person who wants 292
to register his
ill aunt in order to cover her under his county health insurance.
Even before the public hearing, however, the Broward County
Commission considered dropping the provision requiring companies doing
business with the county to offer domestic partnership benefits to their
employees. 293 Instead, three commissioners were said to be recommending
that companies that do offer such benefits be granted bonus points when they
bid on county contracts. 294 It turned out that the county's budget office
discovered that most private companies that would be affected by the
ordinance would be exempt because they are regulated by the federal
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Lisa Arthur, BrowardPoised to OK PartnerBenefits: Not Even Gay Meccas Such
as Key West orMiami Beach Have Laws as Sweeping, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Jan. 17,1999,

at lA.
286. Under the proposal drawn up by the county attorney's office, "companies that do
$50,000 or more in business with the county would have to provide benefits to domestic
partners and relatives of gay and unmarried employees." Jacqueline Charles, Domestic
Partners Plan Faces Revisions, County Contractors May Get Exemption, MIAMI HERALD

(Broward),
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
2L.
292.
293.
294.

Jan. 24, 1999, at 1BR.
Arthur, supra note 285, at 1A.
Id.
Charles, supra note 286, at 1BR.
FLA. STAT. § 741.212 (1999).
Half a PartnershipBroward Effort, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Jan. 17, 1999, at

Id.
Charles, supranote 286, at 1BR.
Id.
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Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").2 95 For this
reason, the ordinance would unduly burden the few companies not covered
by ERISA. 296 The preference system is already in place for women and
minorities who bid on county contracts. 297
Opposition to the proposed ordinance mobilized immediately.2 98
Concerned Citizens for Broward claimed that the proposal undermines the
institution of family and sanctions gay marriages.
In response, the President of the Broward County AFL-CIO, Dan Reynolds, pointed out that most
domestic partners are heterosexuals. 3 °
Despite opposition, the Broward County Commissioners passed the
domestic partnership ordinance on January 26, 1999, by a vote of six to
one. 30 1 Broward's ordinance was modeled after similar ordinances in Miami
Beach, Key West, and San Francisco. 30 2 The final version of the ordinance
included a preference system for awarding bonus points to private companies
intent on doing business with the county and who offer domestic partner
benefits. 30 3 About ninety percent of the county's contractors would be
exempted because their health insurance plans are governed by ERISA. °4
Almost immediately, Wally Lowe, a Broward resident, filed suit
challenging the legality of Broward's ordinance. 30 5 Before trial, Broward
Circuit Court Judge Robert Andrews heard oral arguments on whether Lowe
had standing to bring his lawsuit. 3 06 The county attorneys ar§ued that Lowe
lacked standing since he was not affected by the ordinance.
At the same
hearing, Lowe asked the court to issue a temporary injunction to prevent
implementation of any part of the ordinance pending the outcome of his
suit.3 ° 8 Meanwhile, the County Commissioners considered eliminating biological relatives from the ordinance after the County's insurer announced
that the law would increase rates by thirty percent. 30 9 In late March, 1999
295. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994)).
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Charles, supranote 286, at 1BR.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Jacqueline Charles, County OKs Domestic Partner Law, 6-1, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Jan. 27, 1999, at lB.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Jacqueline Charles, County Wins Postponement in Suit Challenging Domestic
PartnersPlan,MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Mar. 18, 1999, at 2B.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
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Broward County's Director of Human Resources recommended that the
ordinance limit the number of partners that can be added during the year
(permitting a change in partners only once every six months) and also
recommended omitting blood relatives from the ordinance. 3 '0 The blood
relative provision had the potential of raising insurance rates dramatically
because, hypothetically, employees could bring someone very ill into the
pool. 311 By this time, Judge Andrews ruled that Lowe did have standing to
challenge the ordinance under state law.31
Judge Andrews heard oral
arguments on April 21, 1999, while a public hearing was pending on an
amended version of the ordinance.3 13 At the hearing, Lowe's lawyers argued
that the ordinance conflicts with Florida's Defense of Marriage Act, which
bans same-sex marriages, and therefore, the County had exceeded its homerule authority.314 On April 27, 1999, a public hearing was held and the
Commigsioners voted to scale back the ordinance by dropping the blood
relatives provision.3 15 In May of 31
1999,
Judge Andrews ruled in favor of the
6
county, and Lowe filed an appeal.
Finally, Broward County's sweeping new domestic partnership law
r The ordinance, as amended, extended health
took effect on July 12, 1999. 3W
insurance benefits to the unmarried partners-homosexual or heterosexualof county
employees, provided the employees register their partners with the
318
county.

X. PENSION AND RETIREMENT BENEFITS

The first bill Governor Jeb Bush signed into law was the Police and

Firefighters Pension Act of 1999, 3 19 amending the law governing the

310. Jacqueline Charles, Tighten Domestic Partners Ordinance, County Human
Resources ChiefAdvises, MIAM HERALD (Broward), Mar. 23, 1999, at 2B.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Jacqueline Charles, Hearing Today on Suit vs. Domestic Partner Plan, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Apr. 21, 1999, at 6B.
314. Jacqueline Charles, Domestic PartnerLaw Attacked in Court, MiAMI HERALD
(Broward), Apr. 22, 1999, at 3B.
315. Jacqueline Charles, Commission Amends Domestic PartnerLaw, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Apr. 28, 1999, at 2B.
316. Jacqueline Charles, Broward Judge: Domestic PartnershipLaw Legal, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), May 1, 1999, at 3B.
317. Jacqueline Charles, Partnersin Life, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), July 13, 1999, at
IA.
318. Id.
319. 1999 Fla. Laws ch. 99-1.
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disbursement of disability benefits and retirement benefits for public
employees.320
A panel that governs the Florida Retirement System announced in
December, 1998 that for the first time in years, Florida's primary pension
plan is "fully funded on an actuarial basis." 321 This means the state can meet
their pension obligations as thousands of public employees retire over the
coming years. 32 According to an editorial in the Miami Herald,the Florida
Retirement System's assets amount to eighty-five billion dollars-sixty-one
percent invested in United States stocks, and twenty-six percent invested in
bonds.3z Meanwhile, the state senate is reviewing whether to allow state
employees to opt for a "defined
3 contribution plan" akin to the 401(k) plans
prevalent in the private sector. 2
A recurring issue in public pension law is whether retired public
employees who return to public employment must surrender their pension
benefits while they work.
According to an unofficial opinion issued by
Attorney General Gerry Hammond in a May 10, 1999 letter to Plantation
City Attorney Don Lunny Jr., and reported in the Miami Herald, Plantation
City officials can continue to collect retirement benefits when they reenter
public employment. 326 According to this unofficial opinion by Assistant
Attorney General Hammond, "it would appear that the city may not deny a
retired officer simultaneous payment of retirement benefits and a salary for
re-employment with the city.' 27 Even so, Plantation is free to adopt an
ordinance forcing 3the surrender of pension benefits if the retiree rejoins the
public workforce. 2
The question of the legal impact of changing public pension law arose
in the case of Bean v. State.329
was triggered
by a change in the
,, The case
,,
33 "
statutory definition of "joint annuitant" in 1995.
George Bean worked for
the Hillsborough County Aviation Authority for many years. 331 He retired
on July 1, 1996 with over thirty-four years of creditable service with the
320. Don Edgar, Act I FirstBill, MIAMI HERA.D, Mar. 13, 1999, at 5B.
321. Editorial, A Windfall's Fallout,MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 6, 1998, at 2L.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. See generallyWilliam T. McGee, PlantationCouncilman Can CollectBoth Pension
and Salary, State Lawyer Says, MAHvHERAL (Broward), May 26, 1999, at 3B.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. 732 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
330. See FLA. STAT. § 121.021(28) (1995). Compare FLA. STAT. § 121.021(28)
(1993), with FLA. STAT. § 121.021(28) (1995).
331. Bean, 732 So. 2d at 392.
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State. 332 George and Shirley Bean divorced in 1983. 333 At that time, the
State assured George that he could designate both a former wife and a
current wife as joint annuitants so long as Shirley was financially dependent
on him.334 In addition, George agreed to pay Shirley alimony equal to forty
percent of his gross income. - Shirley qualified as a "joint annuitant" until
the term was redefined in 1995.4 Shirley did not, however, qualify as a
"joint annuitant" under the new statutory definition. 337 In light of these
facts, the court reversed the order of the Division of Retirement and held that
George had a vested right to designate Shirley as a "joint annuitant. 33 In
support of this conclusion, the court said the key was that George had
reached his normal retirement date before the statutory definition was
339
changed.
It was 34
irrelevant that he had not yet retired when the new
definition took effect. 0
XI. DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE
A. Just Cause
In order to discipline or discharge most public employees, a public
employer must have a business justification known as "just cause. 3 41 What
constitutes "just cause" under civil service bears a striking resemblance to
"just cause" found in collective bargaining agreements negotiated between
public employers and unions representing government employees.34 2
Discipline and discharge cases are arguably the largest source of employee
grievances. 343 In the public sector, who decides whether to discipline an
employee is a key question. 344 Usually, the employer decides in the first
instance, and the employee is entitled to contest the discipline before a
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.

336. Until 1995, the "definition of 'joint annuitant' included a person who was
financially dependent for at least one-half of his or her support from the retiring member at the
time of that member's retirement." Bean, 732 So. 2d at 392 (citing FLA. STAT. §121.091(6)(d)
(1993)). This option was dropped in 1995. See FLA. STAT. § 121.091 (1995).
337. Bean, 732 So. 2d at 392.
338. Id. at 392-93.
339. Id. at 392.
340. Id.
341. FLA. ADMiN. CODE ANN. r. 60k-4.010(4)(b) (1995).
342. See id.
343. See generally FLA. STAT. § 110.227 (1999).

344. Id.
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neutral decision-maker. 345 Either a civil service commission or an arbitrator
holds a hearing and decides whether the employer, indeed, had just cause to
support the discipline. 346 The losing party at that point either appeals to the
Public Employees Relations Commission ("PERC") or to a state court to
review the civil service commission or arbitrator's decision.347
Many legal questions can be raised upon review, such as: 1) did the
commission or the arbitrator apply the proper evidentiary standard (usually a
preponderance of the evidence instead of the higher clear and convincing
standard); 2) did the punishment fit the crime; 3) were mitigating factors
given proper weight; and 4) does the arbitrator's decision violate public
policy?
Many of these issues were raised in cases reviewed by Florida circuit
courts of appeal in 1998-99. For example, in Mathis v. FloridaDepartment
of Corrections,34 the Department of Corrections ("DOC") tried to dismiss
Earnest Mathis, a career service employee with the DOC. 3 49 Mathis
challenged the proposed discharge by timely filing a notice of appeal with
PERC. 0 PERC reduced the dismissal to a sixty-day suspension, ordered
Mathis reinstated, and ruled that he was entitled to back pay for the time he
was out of work without ever spelling out the amount of back pay owed to
him.351 When negotiations stalled, Mathis filed a petition for issuance of a
computation of back pay.352 PERC denied the petition as late.353 On appeal,
the court ruled that PERC had no authority to deny Mathis any back pay
merely because he failed to meet PERC's deadline, which was not dictated
by statute or rule.35 4 In support of this conclusion, the court noted Mathis's
good faith efforts
to settle the issue with DOC and lack of any prejudice
355
against DOC.

Several disciplinary cases involve prison guards, or so-called
correctional officers. 356 The Miami Herald reported the case of a Miami345. Id.
346. Id.
347. FLA. STAT. § 110.227(5)(b).
348. 726 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
349. Id. at 390.
350. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 447.207(8) (1995) (stating that PERC "shall hear appeals
arising out of any suspension, reduction in pay, transfer, layoff, demotion, or dismissal of any
permanent employee in the State Career Service System").
351. Mathis, 726 So. 2d at 390.
352. Id. at 391.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 392-93.
355. Id. at 393.
356. See Ana Acle & Manny Garcia, Inmate Says Guard Forced Her to Have Sex,
MIAMi HERALD, July 7, 1999, at 7B.
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Dade correctional officer who had been disciplined with pay for reportedly
forcing an inmate to perform oral sex on him in a jury room at the county
courthouse. 357 Although not criminally charged, the eight-year veteran was
relieved 6f duty. 58 The Miami Heraldreported that DNA taken from semen
found on the victim's breast tested positive.359 Police detectives seized the
guard's clothing-even the red underwear that the inmate had minutely
described.36 Sources predicted the guard would be dismissed if the story
were true, whether or not he was criminally charged. 361 The article pointed
out that if the incident had taken place just three weeks later, the guard could
have faced an automatic third-degree felony. 362 A new Florida law, effective
July 1, 1999, treats sex between
363 a correction officer and a prisoner as a
felony even if it is consensual. 3 In earlier cases in 1998-99, one guard was
fired after a prisoner became pregnant with the officer's baby." Another
female guard
was dismissed after reportedly performing oral sex on male
36
inmates. 5
Disciplining prison guards for beating inmates is a recurring issue.366
The most recent incident allegedly took place in July, 1999 when nine
guards were suspended pending a murder investigation into the suspicious
death of a known troublemaker, Frank Valdez, a death row inmate on X
Wing, the toughest hold for the toughest inmates at the Florida State Prison
in Starke, Florida.367 Two dozen state investigators and FBI agents were
368 The Florida Department of Law Enforcement
investigating
369
,,
. the death.
(FDLE")
is
in
charge
of
the
case.
The DOC
is encouraging
guards to
cooperate. 370 Valdez's death has triggered
numerous
tips andthegrievances

357. Id.

358. Id.

359.
360.
361.
362.

Id.
Id.
Acle & Garcia, supra note 356, at 7B.
Id.

363. Id. (citing S. Res. 1788, 1999 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1999) (amending FLA.
944.35(3)(b) and creating FLA. STAT. § 951.221)).
364. Acle & Garcia, supra note 356, at 7B.

STAT. §

365. Id.
366. See generally GuardsAllegedly Beat Inmate to Death, WASH. PoST, July 22, 1999,

at A9.
367. Phil Long & Steve Bousquet, Big Law-Enforcement Team Investigating Death of
Inmate, MAm HERAD, Aug. 5, 1999, at 9B.
368. Id.

369. Id.
370. Id.

Published by NSUWorks, 1999

31

Nova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 4

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 24:73

from inmates across the state. 37 1 The FBI agents, meanwhile, are working on
federal civil rights issues.372
On August 6, 1999 three correctional officer recruits were dismissed as
part of the Valdez investigation.373 In light of their probationary status, no
grounds were given for their dismissal.
Moreover eleven guards were
suspended with pay in the wake of the Valdez death. 375 But, one of these
correctional officers will return to work at the prison owing to his change of
heart to cooperate with the investigation. 376 News reports indicate that one
of the guards implicated in the Valdez death has a history of allegations of
abuse of inmates. 7 Six complaints by inmates over a five-year period were
found in the personnel file of this guard.378 After one of these grievances
was confirmed, the guard was suspended "for 60 days without 3Pay for
inappropriate use of force" after putting down an inmate skirmish. 79 Even
so, this guard was named Officer of the Month for June 1997.380
In Dalem v. Department of Corrections,381 Anthony Dalem was
promoted to correctional officer lieutenant. 382 While serving as the shift
supervisor, he responded to a radio alert that fighting had broken out in the
prison dormitories.383 Although Dalem arrived after the fight had been
broken up, officers Krueger and Arpan testified that Dalem beat inmate
Wayne Green, although Green offered no resistance. 384 Among other things,
Dalem allegedly kicked Green in the chest several times and once in the
neck, and stood on top of a footlocker, and twice jumped onto Green's
back. 385 Later, Dalem denied he was even at the scene.
The DOC accused
Dalem of abuse of an inmate, willful violations of rules and regulations, and
88
7
giving false testimony. 38 An evidentiary hearing was held before PERC.1
371. Id.
372. Long & Bousquet, supra note 367, at 9B.
373. Steve Bousquet, 3 CorrectionalRecruits Firedin Valdez Case, MiAMI HERALD, Aug.
6, 1999, at lB.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Steve Bousquet, GuardAccused Repeatedly of Abuse, MLAWI HERALD, Aug. 7, 1999,
at lB.
378. Id.
379. ld.
380. Id.
381. 720 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).

382. Id. at 575.
383. Id.
384. Id.

385. Id.
386. Dalem, 720 So. 2d at 575.
387. Id. at 576.
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The hearing officer found that the DOC had reasonable cause to discharge
filed
Dalem for his beating of Green and then lying about his role.38 9 Dalem
39
an appeal with PERC, which affirmed the hearing officer's ruling. 0
On appeal, Dalem argued that the hearing officer applied the
preponderance of the evidence standard instead of the clear and convincing
standard.391 The court concluded that the hearing officer properly applied
the right standard for termination hearings. 392 Dalem also argued that the
hearing officer's decision was not supported by competent substantial
393 The
evidence and that he failed to consider
394relevant mitigating factors.
arguments.
court rejected both of these
The question of what mitigatory criteria PERC may consider in
reviewing discipline meted out to a public employee arose in Nordheim v.
Department of EnvironmentalProtection.395 Gregory Nordheim worked as a
pilot for the Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP"). 396 In 1991
he sustained injuries in a serious aircraft accident while he was performing
several tasks at the same time. 397 Although the plane was destroyed,
Nordheim was not disciplined.398 Nordheim caused another accident while
39
flying surveillance in March, 1997.
He failed to lower the landing gear
and the plane sustained $5416 worth of damage because he was trying to do
too many tasks at once.4 w DEP at first demoted Nordheim to the rank of
boat officer, but changed the demotion to a dismissal when it became
apparent that Nordheirn was physically unable to perform the duties of boat
officer in light of his injuries.4
Nordheim appealed his dismissal to PERC, which held a three-day
hearing. 402 The hearing officer ruled that DEP had cause to fire Nordheim
for negligence and that no statutorily prescribed mitigatory criteria applied to

388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Dalem,720 So. 2d at 576.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. 719 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review denied, 729 So. 2d 393
(Fla. 1999).
396. Id. at 1213.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Nordheim,7719 So. 2d at 1213.
401. Id. at 1213- -14.
402. Id. at 1214.
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reduce his dismissal. 40 3 Upon review, PERC found there were offsetting
factors and reduced the punishment from a dismissal to a ninety-day
suspension. 4 As for the mitigation criterion that PERC found relevant,
"action taken with respect to similar conduct by other employees, 4 °5 PERC
concluded that the hearing officer improperly restricted Nordheim's
evidence dealing with earlier incidents of negligence that did not result in
discipline. 4° For this reason, PERC ruled that
4 Nordheim's punishment
amounted to disparate treatment by his employer. W
On appeal, the court reversed PERC's ruling because PERC refused to
take into account its own case of Jackson v. Department of Juvenile
408
Justice, which made clear that a new aWncy is not bound by earlier
disciplinary actions taken by its predecessor.
The three employees PERC
compared to Nordheim all sustained accidents with DEP's predecessor, the
Florida Marine Patrol.410 The court ruled that PERC abused its discretion in
refusing to take into account the rule in Jackson and that the decision was
"[i]nconsistent with officially stated agency policy or a prior agency
practice" not accounted for by PERC. 1 The issue of mitigation grounded
on the lack of discipline of former workers for analogous misconduct was
raised before the hearing officer.412 The court remanded the case to PERC to
reconsider the hearing officer's findings and to take into account the rule in
Jackson.413
In Cephas v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services,414 John
Cephas worked for the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services ("HRS' 2 as an interviewing clerk for a program that issued checks
for buying food.
In this capacity, Cephas issued four checks to Tawanda
Baker, a client of the program. 41 Later, Baker applied for an apartment,
4
indicating she was a HRS employee and that Cephas was her supervisor. 0
In verifying Baker's employment, the leasing agent spoke to a male who
403. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 447.208(3)(d) (1995).
404. Nordheim,719 So.2d at 1214.
405. FLA.STAT. § 447.208(3)(d)2.
406. Nordheim,719 So.2d at 1214.
407. Id.
408. 12 F.C.S.R. 163 (1997).
409. Nordheim, 719 So. 2d at 1214.
410. Id.
411. Id.(citing FLA. STAT. § 120.68(6)(e)3 (Supp.1996)).
412. Id.
413. Id.at 1215.
414. 719 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review denied, 729 So. 2d 390 (Fla.
1999), and review denied,729 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 1999).
415. Id.at 8.
416. Id.
417. Id.
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identified himself as Mr. Cephas and represented that he was Baker's
supervisor and that Baker was an able employee. 418 The next day, unable to
reach Baker at home, the agent called the HRS office in Plant City and
learned that Baker did not work there.4 19 It turns out that Cephas was not
Baker's supervisor, and based on these facts, HRS dismissed Cephas for
misconduct.420 On appeal to PERC, the Ihearing
officer affirmed HRS's
- 421
action and PERC ratified the recommendation.
On appeal, the court ruled that the evidence was not adequate to support
a finding of misconduct because the leasing agent never nailed down
Cephas's identity as the person whom she talked to about Baker.422
According to the court, telephone conversations are only reliable evidence if
"'the identity of the person with whom the conversation was had is
established by direct evidence, facts or circumstances."' 423 In short, HRS
could not assume the person who424answered Cephas's phone was in fact
Cephas without corroborative facts.
When a public employee is disciplined "for cause," what kinds of
defenses may the employee raise to undercut the employer's case? In Doyle
v. Department of Business & Professional Regulation,425 Elizabeth Doyle
worked as a special agent with the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and
Tobacco ("ABT"), an arm of the Department of Business and Professional
Regulation. 4 6 Doyle's coworker accused her of unbecoming conduct and
sexual harassment, and Doyle was placed on administrative leave.427 In an
interview, Doyle denied ever using vulgar language, but later amended her
answer to admit she used "common squad room language. ' 428 ABT fired
Doyle: 1) "for lying," 2) for "unbecoming conduct," 429 and 3) "for using
418. Id.

419.
420.
421.
422.

Cephas,719 So.2d at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
423. Id. (quoting Zeigler v. State, 402 So. 2d 365, 374 (Fla. 1981)).
424. Cephas, 719 So. 2d at 9 (citing Mack v. Widrowicz, 556 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1990)).
425. 713 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
426. Id. at 1041.
427. Id. at 1042.
428. Id.
429. Id. n.2 (citing FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 61-2.010 (1990)). The code defines
unbecoming conduct as:
Any willful action or conduct by an employee which impedes the
Department's efforts, brings discredit on the Department, impairs the
operation or efficiency of the Department or any employee, impairs the
employee's ability to perform his or her job, or results in the reluctance or

refusal on the part of others to work with the employee.
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vulgar or abusive language." 430 PERC convened a formal hearing, 431 and
Doyle raised the defense of condonation, asserting that the agency condoned
vulgar and sexually explicit language in the ABT offices.432 Moreover,
Doyle stated that ABT workers regularly posted on their office walls
sexually explicit, pornographic and vulgar signs, pictures, and jokes.4 33
PERC's hearing officer agreed with Doyle's defense of condonation to the
improper language charge.4M Before Doyle could be disciplined for using
vulgar language, the agency owed her notice that future use of such improper
language was grounds for discipline.435 The hearing officer ruled that Doyle
met her burden of proving the defense of condonation and that the agency
lacked just cause to discipline her for abusive language. 436 Left intact,
however, were four other charges of unbecoming conduct, but the hearing
officer nevertheless
reduced the discipline to a sixty-calendar-day
437
suspension.
PERC remanded the case to the hearing officer to clarify the lying
charge. 438 The hearing officer ruled that "when Doyle denied using vulgar or
sexually explicit language at the office in front of other employees, during
the investigation, she was lying to Harris." 439 PERC affirmed the hearing
officer's findings but agreed with the agency that lying during an internal
440
investigation about her job-related conduct warranted Doyle's dismissal.
On appeal, Doyle alleged due process violations which the court
rejected in light of the 1998 Supreme Court decision in La Chance v.
Erickson44 which held that due process does not encompass the right of the
employee "to 'put the government to its proof' by falsely denying the
charged conduct, or 'a right to make false statements with respect to the
charged [mis]conduct,' in an agency investigation." 442 In response, Doyle
contends that article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution grants stronger

Doyle, 713
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.

So. 2d at 1043 n.2 (quoting FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62-2.010).
Id. at 1042-43.
Id. (according to FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1) (1995)).

Id.
Id.
Doyle, 713 So. 2d at 1043.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1044.
Id.
Doyle, 713 So. 2d at 1044.
Id.
522 U.S. 262 (1998).

442. Doyle, 713 So. 2d at 1044 (quoting La Chance v. Erickson, 522 U.S. 262, 266
(1998)) (internal citations omitted).
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due process protection than the United States Constitution. 443 Sidestepping
Doyle's argument altogether, the court concluded that there was insufficient
evidence that Doyle ever lied.444 Doyle's later explanation of her denial of
ever using vulgar language raised facts implicating her condonation
defense.445 So, as the court phrased it, Doyle's "denial was merely a legal
conclusion or a matter of personal opinion which should not be punishable
as a lie." 446 In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on caselaw
In this context, Doyle's "denial was merely an
interpreting perjury. 4
assertion of her legal defense-a legal conclusion or a matter of personal
In sum, "'[recise questioning is
opinion-not a statement of fact."
The court remanded
imperative as a predicate for the offense of perjury."'
the case to PERC for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.450
In City of Tallahassee v. Big Bend Police Benevolent Association,5 1 the
City fired Thomas Maureau, a lieutenant in the Tallahassee Police
Department, for engaging in alleged sex acts while on duty and then lying
452 Under a collective bargaining agreement, Maureau was entitled
about it.
At the conclusion of an
to file a grievance and go to arbitration.
evidentiary hearing, the arbitrator upheld only one of the City's charges,
454
lying, and reinstated Maureau after a four-month suspension without pay.
The Ci y appealed and urged the trial court to overturn the arbitrator's
award.
The trial court was unable however, to find any statutory grounds
for vacating the arbitrator's award. 45 Florida law provides that:
(1) Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an
[arbitrator's] award when:
(a) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other
undue means.
(b) There was evident partiality ....

443. Id. at 1045 (citing Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1992)).

444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Doyle, 713 So. 2d at 1045.
448. Id. at 1046.
449. Id. (quoting Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 362 (1973)).

450. Id.
451. 710 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
452. Id. at 214-15.
453. Id. at 215.

454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Big Bend, 710 So. 2d at 215.
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(c) The arbitrators or the umpire in the course of her or his
jurisdiction exceeded their powers.
(d) The arbitrators... refused to postpone the hearing upon
sufficient cause being shown therefor or refused to hear evidence
material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted the hearing,
contrary to the provisions of s. 682.06, as to prejudice substantially
the rights of a party.
(e) There was no agreement or provision for arbitration subject
to this law.... 457
On appeal, the City argued that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by
erroneously adopting a clear and convincing evidentiary standard instead of
the preponderance of the evidence standard. 458 The First District Court of
Appeal ruled that even if true, adoption of the stricter standard falls short of
legal grounds for vacating the arbitrator's award under section 682.13(1), of
the Florida Statutes.459 The court also rejected the City's claim that
reinstating Maureau violated public policy because police officers must
possess good moral character. 6 Since the arbitrator found insufficient
evidence of a romantic
relationship with another police officer, public policy
461
was not violated.
A concurring opinion by Judge Booth made clear that arbitrators are not
free to adopt the heightened burden of proof in
462 disciplinary cases, but he did
not think the issue had been preserved below.
B.

Misconduct by Public Officials

In Hamidullah v. Burke,463 Governor Lawton Chiles suspended MiamiDade County District Two Commissioner James C. Burke from his seat on
the Miami-Dade County Commission, pursuant to article IV, section 7 of the
Florida Constitution.
Burke had been indicted on federal public
465
corruption charges.
He resigned and a special election was held to fill the
vacancy on the commission.
Despite his indictment and suspension,
Burke declared himself a candidate for his old seat, prompting voters to go to
457. FLA. STAT. § 682.13(1) (1999).

458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.

Big Bend, 710 So. 2d at 215.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 216.
23 Fla. L. Weekly D675 (3d Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 1998).
Id. at D675-76.
Id. at D676.
Id. at D675.
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467
court to stop him from running.
The circuit court for Dade County refused
46 running.
to stop Burke from
On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's
ruling.469 Nothing in the state constitution or in Florida's statutes renders
Burke ineligible to run for office. 470 Absent constitutional or statutory
prohibition, only the legislature is authorized to set eligibility standards for
public office. 47 The court refused to encroach on the power of the
electorate, of the Governor, and of the legislature.472 The court rejected the
argument that article IV, section 7 of the Florida Constitution dictates that a
suspended official may not run for his office until acquitted.473 At most, that
provision empowers the Governor to suspend a public official indicted for a
crime until he is acquitted. 474 To be sure, the court noted that the Governor
475
still has the power to suspend Burke again should he win the election.
Defamation of political candidates uttered by anyone during campaigns
received attention from the Florida Legislature in 1999. 476 The House
Judiciary Committee debated the relative merits of a proposed bill that
would hold "all persons accountable for the truthfulness of their statements
regarding candidates." 477 The bill, proposed by Representative Bill Posey,
R-Rockledge, would set up an administrative agency to oversee truth and
would "put those who falsely claim that a candidate violated this law at peril
of criminal felony charges." 47 In an editorial, the Miami Herald criticized
the bill as flawed in two respects: "It is of dubious constitutionality, and it
fails to deal with some of the ugliest aspects of campaigns, such as clever
distortions and ethnic or racial pandering."479 The editorial regarded the bill
as weakening the current United States Supreme Court standard for libel by
holding someone liable for making statements they should have known were
false. " v Under the federal standard, actual malice, and not mere negligence
must be proved.481

467. Id. at D675-76.
468. Hamidullah,23 Fla. L. Weekly at D675.
469. Id. at D676.

470. Id.
471. Id.
472. Id.
473. Hamidullah, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D676.
474. Id.

475. Id.
476. Editorial, A Threat to Free Speech CampaignReform Bill, MIAMI

HERALD,

Mar.

24, 1999, at 18A.
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. Id.
480. Id.
481. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 255 (1964).
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In United States v. Starks,482 community health aides working for IRS
and the president of a drug treatment provider were convicted for violating
the anti-kickback provision of the Social Security Act.483 When they started
working at HRS, the public employees were warned about accepting any
outside employment giving rise to a conflict of interest and were told to
report any outside employment to HRS. 4 4 The public employees agreed to
refer patients to the drug treatment business for $250 per patient without
reporting their referral arrangement to HRS. 48 5 At trial, some of the referrals
testified that the HRS employees threatened that HRS would take away their
babies if they did not go in for treatment for their drug addictions. 486 In sum,
the two HRS employees referred eighteen women and were paid $323,023 in
Medicaid payments.48 7 The United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida sentenced Starks to two concurrent terms of thirty months
of home detention.488
On appeal, the HRS employees argued that the jury should have been
instructed that, because of the Anti-Kickback statute's mens rea component,
the employees had to have known that their referral arrangement violated the
federal statute before they could be convicted.4 9 The Eleventh Circuit's jury
instruction for the term "willfully" reads: "The word willfully, as that term
is used from time to time in these instructions, means the act was committed
voluntarily and purposely, with the specific intent to do something the law
49
forbids, that is with a bad purpose, either to disobey or disregard the law." 0
The Eleventh Circuit also cited the Supreme Court decision in Bryan v.
United States,491 which made clear that a jury may find a defendant guilty of
willfully violating a statute if it thinks "'that the defendant acted with an
evil-meaning mind, that is to say, that he acted with knowledge that his
conduct was unlawful.' ' 492 In other words, the willfulness requirement does
not amount to an exception to the general rule that ignorance of the law is no
excuse; knowledge that behavior is unlawful is enough. 493 The giving or
taking of kickbacks for medical referrals is clearly illegal, indeed, close to

482. 157 F.3d 833 (11th Cir. 1998).
483. Id. at 835; see 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1994).
484. Starks, 157 F.3d at 836.
485. Id.
486. Id. at 837.

487.
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.
493.

Id.
Id.
Starks, 157 F.3d at 837.
Id. at 837-38.
524 U.S. 184 (1998).
Starks, 157 F.3d at 838 (quoting Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193 (1998)).
Id. (citing Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 195 (1998)).
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malum in se.494 The court upheld the trial court's jury instruction on the
meaning of the word "willful." 495
As for the vagueness challenge, a criminal statute must define the crime
with a degree of clarity to put ordinary people on notice what behavior is
banned. 496- The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the Anti-Kickback statute
was not vague, citing Supreme Court criteria: "whether the statute (1)
involves only economic regulation, (2) provides only civil, rather than
criminal, penalties, (3) contains a scienter requirement mitigating vagueness,
and (4) threatens any constitutionally protected rights. ' 497- Applying these
factors, the court reasoned that the Anti-Kickback statute regulates only
economic behavior and does not violate any constitutional rights.498 In sum,
the IIRS employees had adequate notice that their behavior was unlawful.49 9
Another case drawing a distinction among classes of public employees
was Service Employees International Union v. Public Employees Relations
Commission.5 0 Patricia O'Brien worked as a deputy court clerk in Orlando
when she was fired, allegedly because she "reported and was paid for more
hours than she actually worked on repeated occasions." 50 1 By contrast
O'Brien contends she was terminated because of her union activities.
O'Brien filed5 0an
3 unfair labor practice charge with PERC, which sustained
her discharge.
On appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal framed "the issue [as]
whether a deputy court clerk is in fact a 'public employee"' under article I,
section 6 of the Florida Constitution and section 447.203(3) of the Florida
Statutes.5 4 The Clerk of Court appoints, rather than employs, deputy
clerks. 505 Earlier precedent judged deputy court clerks not to be public
employees.5° The court grudgingly agreed, but urged the state supreme
court to address the question.
494.
495.
496.
497.

Id.
Id. at 839.
Id.
Starks, 157 F.3d at 839 (quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S.

489,498-99 (1982)).
498. Id. at 840.
499. Id.
500. 720 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review granted,732 So. 2d 328

(Fla. 1999).
501. Id. at 291.
502. Id.
503. Id.
504. Id.
505. Service Employees Int'l Union, 720 So. 2d at 291.
506. Id. (citing Federation of Pub. Employees v. Public Employees Relations Comm'n,
478 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).

507. Id.
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Whistle-blowing and RetaliatoryDischarge

Florida has enacted a Whistle-blower's Act, 508 aimed at protecting
public employees who report or disclose employment-related wrongdoing,
usually by management. 5u9 The law shields employee disclosure of past,
present, or otential wrongdoing by supervisors, coworkers, or public
employers.
Several cases raised the question whether the whistle-blower has
exhausted
administrative channels of relief. 51 The Florida Whistle-blower's
Act, provides,
in part:
Within 60 days after the action prohibited by this section, any local
public employee protected by this section may file a complaint with
the appropriate local governmental authority, if that authority has
established by ordinance an administrative procedure ... Within

180 days after entry of a final decision by the local governmental
authority, the public employee who filed the complaint may bring a
civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction. If the local
governmental authority has not established an administrative
procedure by ordinance or contract, a local public employee may,
within 180 days after the action prohibited by this section, bring a
civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction. 512
In City of Miami v. Del Rio,513 a City of Miami police officer "blew the
whistle" on his superiors over the legality of certain orders by disclosing the
51 4
alleged wrongdoing to other public agencies, including the state attorney.
In response, Del Rio alleges that his superiors retaliated against him.515 Del
Rio went to court, suing the City, the Chief of Police, and three of his
superior officers, for violations of the Whistle-blower's Act. 516 Del Rio
claimed he had exhausted all administrative remedies. 1 7
On appeal, Del Rio changed his argument, alleging that there was no
administrative remedy since the board he went to denied him a hearing by
508. FLA. STAT. § 112.3187 (1999).
509. See id.
510. See id.
511. See City of Miami v. Del Rio, 723 So. 2d 299, 300 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998),
review denied,733 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1999).
512. FLA. STAT. § 112.3187(8)(b).
513. 723 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
514. Id. at 300.
515. Id.
516. Id.
517. Id.
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delay tactics and, therefore
518 he was free to bypass the administrative route
For its part, the City contends that its code
and go directly to court.
established an administrative board 519 with the power to hear whistle-blower
complaints, but that Del Rio abandoned his complaint before the board
rendered its decision.5s
In other words, Del Rio failed to exhaust his
administrative remedy and forfeits the right to go to court. 52 1 The Third
District Court of Appeal ruled that the Civil Service Board met the
requirements of the Whistle-blower's Act, and therefore, Del Rio must first
exhaust his remedy before the Board. 52 The Board delayed its proceedings
to secure additional information from Del Rio who, instead of complying
with the board's request, abandoned his petition
and filed for judicial
524
relief.523 Del Rio's suit was deemed premature.
In Dinehart v. Town of Palm Beach,5 Mary Dinehart worked in the
finance department of the Town of Palm Beach and took part in an
investigation of her supervisor, but the town council decided against firing
the supervisor.52 In the aftermath, Dinehart was transferred to another
department, which prompted her suit against the town under the public
Whistle-blower's Act.5 27 The circuit court for Palm Beach County granted
summary judgment in favor of the Town because the Town had set up an
administrative procedure for reviewing whistle-blower claims, and Dinehart
had failed to go through that board. 5
On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal framed the issue as
whether Dinehart had exhausted her administrative remedies before filing
suit. 529 Dinehart argued that the Town's administrative procedure did not
meet the legal requirements set out in section 112.3187(8)(b) of the Florida
Statutes.53° Under the town's procedures, employees must first discuss their
complaint with their immediate supervisor unless the complaint deals with a
suspension, demotion, or dismissal.531 Next, workers should take their
518. Del Rio, 723 So. 2d at 300.
519. Id. at 300. "The City contends its Civil Service Board ... as set forth in section
36(a), Miami, Fla., Charter, meets the requirements of [the Whistle-blower's Act]." Id. (citations

omitted).
520.
521.
522.
523.
524.
525.
526.
527.
528.
529.
530.
531.

Id. at 301.
Id.
Del Rio, 723 So. 2d at 301.
Id.
Id.
728 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
Id. at 360.
Id.
Id. at 361.
Id. at 362.
Dinehart,728 So. 2d at 361 (citing FLA. STAT. § 112.3187(8)(b) (1995)).
Id.
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grievance to the department head.532 Third, employees should appeal to a
grievance resolution board.533 If the complaint deals with a suspension,
demotion, or dismissal, however, workers must "proceed directly to the
grievance resolution board," which then "submits its recommendation to the
town counsel for action. 534
It is clear from the face of the Whistle-blower's Act that the legislature
left the details of the procedure up to the town, so long as complaints are
heard by a panel of impartial decision-makers, and the procedure otherwise
abides by due process.
The court concluded that even though the town's
procedure did not guarantee an impartial panel, its procedure duly satisfies
the Act's criteria.
Moreover, the town's procedure requires findings by
the grievance committee to be submitted to the town council.537 In sum,
Dinehart failed to exhaust the administrative remedies.538
In Harris v. District Board of Trustees,539 coordinators of a criminal
justice program run by a community college, who were fired, sued the
college, and its president, among others, claiming that their termination was
in retaliation for their whistle-blowing acts. 54° The alleged wrongdoing
involved irregularities and departures from law and policy going on in the
college's Criminal Justice Training Program.5 4 Shattler was the program's
manager. 542 The plaintiffs alleged that he took no action in response to their
complaints, so they took their case to the Florida Department of Law
Enforcement ("FDLE"). 54 3 During FDLE's investigation of the program,
Buckley, the director of the division of career and special programs fired
Harris, allegedly on financial grounds. 544 Other acts of retaliation include:
unwarranted criticism; verbal abuse; searches through personal papers, such
as a diary; and negative performance evaluations. 5
The Federal District Court for the Middle District of Florida reached
the following conclusions: 1) the plaintiffs established that the college
president had violated their First Amendment rights; 2) the plaintiffs' speech
532.
533.
534.
535.
536.
537.
538.
539.
540.
541.
542.
543.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Dinehart,728 So. 2d at 361.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 362.
9 F. Supp. 2d 1319 (M.D. Fla. 1998).
Id. at 1319.
Id. at 1322.
Id.
Id.

544. Harris,9 F. Supp. 2d at 1322.
545. Id.
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touched on matters of public concern; 3) the college president was not acting
within the scope of her discretionary authority to trigger qualified immunit"
4) the time for filing a lawsuit under the Florida Whistle-blower's Act
began when the plaintiffs read a newspaper interview in which they were
blamed for problems in the program; 5) the persons in their individual
capacities are not liable under the state whistle-blower law; 6) the plaintiffs
satisfied the whistleblower's act when they sent their memo to FDLE, since
it supervised the criminal justice instruction; 7) the plaintiffs also established
false light invasion of privacy (the newspaper account is arguably highly
offensive to a reasonable person and the supervisor made his comments with
a reckless disregard for their truth); 8) the plaintiffs did not state a § 1983
claim; and
9) the Eleventh Amendment bars a suit against a community
54 7
college.
However, not all retaliation cases implicate a whistle blower's act. For
example, in Barron v. Public Health Trust,548 Joseph Barron refused to lend
his hand in an alleged altering and discarding of patient care plans and other
medical records when he worked for the Public Health Trust because he
believed such conduct to be illegal.549 Barron shared his concerns with the
Vice President of Satellite Services for the Trust.550 Retaliation took the
form, Barron alleged, of the transferring of one of his subordinates to
another department, and of threatening to force Barron to work at night,55
After Barron returned to work, following an approved medical leave, the
director refused to accommodate Barron's impaired condition. 52 Barron
regarded this refusal as a constructive
discharge that left him no choice but
553
to resign his job with the Trust.
Barron sued the Trust in the District Court for the Southern District of
Florida alleging free speech violations under § 1983 of title 42 of the United
States Code and article I, section 4 of the Florida Constitution.55 4 Defendant
Reardon claimed qualified immunity from suit given that Barron's speech
did not bear on a matter of public concern.555 He also claimed that Barron's
speech rights were outweighed by his employer's interest in running an
efficient agency, and that the alleged retaliation did not qualify as an

546. FLA. STAT. § 112.3187 (1999).
547. Harris,9 F. Supp. 2d at 1324-30.
548. 22 F. Supp. 2d 1368 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
549. Id. at 1369.

550. Id.
551. ld.
552. ld.
553. Barron,22 F. Supp. 2d at 1369-70.

554. Id. at 1370.
555. Id.
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cc,,556

"adverse employment action under the First Amendment.
The court only
addressed whether the alleged retaliation
constituted
adverse
employment
55 7
action under the First Amendment.
The federal district court concluded that the alleged acts of retaliation
did not rise to the level of an adverse employment action under the First
Amendment.55 8 Transferring one of Barron's subordinates and threatening
to force Barron to work at night are not manifestly illegal retaliation under
the First Amendment.55 9 As for the constructive discharge, Barron voluntarily resigned when his supervisor properly refused to accommodate his disability.5 6 Barron's supervisor never suggested that Barron resign, nor did he
threaten to terminate him.561 In sum, Barron's working conditions were not
so intolerable that he had no choice but to quit. 562 For purposes of qualified
immunity, Reardon's actions did not clearly amount to adverse employment.56 3 Reardon's codefendant, Ward, enjoyed an even stronger claim to
qualified immunity because, at worst, Ward failed to end Reardon's alleged
acts of retaliation:5 64 Since Reardon is entitled to qualified immunity, a
fortiori, so is Ward 5 65
In Dade County Police Benevolent Ass'n v. Town of Surfside,566 the
police union filed an unfair labor practice with PERC, alleging that the
Town of Surfside fired Officers Marchese and Casabo for engaging in protected activity, specifically, their support of a union-sponsored survey dealing with the Town's police department. 567 At PERC's hearing, one witness
testified that the dismissed officers coerced and intimidated other officers,
568
The
unlawfully disrupted the investigation, and lied to the investigators.
police chief made clear that he did not discharge the officers for engaging in
protected activity.569 The hearing officer concluded, and PERC's final order
affirmed, that the officers were dismissed for cause.

556.
557.
558.
559.
560.
561.
562.
563.
564.
565.
566.
567.
568.
569.
570.

Id.
Id.
Barron,22 F. Supp. 2d at 1370.
Id.
Id. at 1371.
Id.
Id.
Barron,22 F. Supp. 2d at 1372.
Id. at 1373.
Id.
721 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 746.
Id.
Id. at 746-47.
Id. at 747.
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On appeal, the police union claimed that the hearing officer accorded
undue weight to hearsay evidence. 571 Rejecting this argument, the Third
District Court of Appeal ruled that the documents at issue were not introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but only to prove the employer's
state of mind in firing the officers.57 2 The dismissals were upheld.573
An article in the Miami Heraldreported on a couple of retaliation cases
involving public employees.5 74 In one, Florida's Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") reached a settlement with a public employees'
union entitling workers to express professional opinions without fear of
retaliation. 575 Moreover, DEP agreed to lobby for legislation aimed at
protecting public employees against intimidating lawsuits by developers. 76
Another article in the Miami Heraldreported on a lawsuit filed by a City of
Miramar Police Captain against the City.577 The police captain alleged that
he was demoted after he told the Miami Herald that a high profile company,
which had made campaign contributions to city commissioners, was awarded
a towing contract, even though it overcharged residents. 578 The City denied
the charge, claiming that the demotion was wholly a fiscal decision.
D. ProceduralDue Process
When is a public agency required to process an employee's grievance?
This issue was addressed in Soto v. Board of County Commissioners 580 Soto
was a county employee who sued the county for refusing to process a
grievance he had filed.58 ' According to the county's own grievance
procedure, any violation of personnel regulations would trigger the grievance
procedure.58 2 The reviewing court made clear that "[w]here a governmental
agency provides that employee disputes shall be resolved through a
grievance process, the agency is bound to fully comply with its own rules

571. Dade County PoliceBenevolent Ass'n, 721 So. 2d at 747.
572. L

573. Id.
574. Environmental Employees Settle Dispute with State, MIAMI HERAlD, Apr. 14, 1999,

at5B.
575. Id.
576. Id.
577. Caroline Keough, Miramar Police Captain Sues City Over Demotion, MIAI
HALD (Broward), Mar. 31, 1999, at 2B.
578. l
579. Id.

580. 716 So. 2d 863 (Fla.5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).

581. 1l at 864.
582. Id.
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and policies." 583 The regulations also contain an anti-retaliation provision,
and Soto claims that he was denied a promotion because of an earlier
grievance that he had filed. 584 The Fifth District Court of Appeal issued a
writ of mandamus to force the Board of County Commissioners
to process
5 85
Soto's grievance in accordance with its own procedures.
Is due process violated if PERC refuses to consider an appeal that is untimely filed? In Ford v. Public Employees Relations Commission,586 PERC
affirmed Ford's dismissal as a probation officer.587 Ford's court appeal of
PERC's decision was dismissed because it was late. 588 So, Ford asked PERC
to allow him to file a belated appeal589 PERC turned Ford down, asserting
that only an appellate court can authorize a belated appeal. 59 0
On appeal, citing Supreme Court of Florida precedent, 51 the court
recognized egregious circumstances preventing a litigant from filing on time
and that either PERC or an appellate court was authorized to permit the
belated appeal. 592 For example, due process is violated if PERC's order had
been entered, but never transmitted to the litigant, and the time to file an
appeal expires. 593 But, the court affirmed PERC's dismissal of Ford's
untimely appeal, an9way, because Ford never alleged that his counsel did
not receive notice.
E.

FirstAmendment
1. Free Speech: Matters of Public Concern

Public employees need not check their constitutional rights of free
speech at the workplace door.595 Whether speech by a public employee is

583. kIL (citing Fredericks v. School Bd. of Monroe County, 307 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1975)).
584. Id. at 864.
585. Soto, 716 So. 2d at 865.
586. 717 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
587. Id. at 150.
588. Id.
589. Id.
590. Id.
591. Ford, 717 So. 2d at 150 (citing Millinger v. Broward County Mental Health Div.,
672 So. 2d 24, 27 (Fla. 1996)).
592. Id.
593. Id.
594. Id.
595. O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996); Picketing v.
Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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entitled to First Amendment protection however, often turns on whether it is
speech on a matter of public concern.
An article in the Miami Herald reported on a tenured Florida State
University ("FSI') psychology professor, who came under fire after it
surfaced that he wrote a glowing introduction to My Awakening, the
autobiography of David Duke, a former Ku Klux Klan grand wizard and
state representative in Louisiana.597 The right to free speech and academic
freedom is pitted against the impulse to censor views repugnant to most
people who make up the FSU commumity. 98 FSU's president is on record as
a defender of free speech in an academic community.599 Some have accused
the professor of "racial harassment" of African-American students, but a
review of the professor's rading record turned up no evidence of bias
against minority students.
Although the professor's specialty is genetic
research involving mice, his racial views have been dismissed as "junk
science."
In an editorial, the Miami Herald dismissed the professor's
racial views as claptrap and an embarrassment to FSU, but made clear that
the First Amendment and academic freedom protect him.60
In Huerta v. Hillsborough County,a6 3 Henry Huerta worked for
Hillsborough County for seventeen years as Executive Manager of the Office
of Consumer Affairs and Child Care LicensingY' 4 On June 9, 1991, the
Tampa Tribune quoted Huerta in an article that criticized the County's
childcare licensing program.6 5 Two days later, Huerta was dismissed, and
he sued the County and Pat Gray Bean, the person who fired him.6
On apeal, the issue turned on whether Bean was entitled to qualified
immunity.
Under the law "a government official.., is entitled to
qualified immunity from civil suit in the performance of discretionary
functions when the official's conduct does not violate any clearly established
statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person should have

596. Pickering,391 U.S. at 573.
597. Herald Staff, The Right to Be Wrong On ControversialIssues, MIAHI HERAIZ, Apr.
6, 1999, at 18A.
598. ld.
599. Id.
600. Id.
601. Id.
602. The Right to Be Wrong on ControversialIssues, supra note 597, at 18A.
603. 720 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).

604. Id. at 276.
605. Id. at 276-77.
606. Id. at 277.
607. Id.
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known. ' 608 The trial court ruled that under this standard, Bean was entitled
to qualified immunity. 6 09 On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal
reversed the trial court's grant of qualified immunity to Bean. 1 0
The appellate court's decision stemmed from its conclusion that
Huerta's speech touched on a matter of public concern. 61' At that point, the
employee's interest in speaking freely must be weighed against the
employer's interest in running an efficient agency.
Applying the
Pickering v. Boardof Educationl balancing test, the court left no 6doubt
that
4
Huerta's First Amendment right outweighed any employer interest. 1
Huerta spoke on the issue of licensing and inspection of day care
facilities. Not only was Huerta the executive manager for child
care licensing and qualified to make an informed opinion on the
issue as it existed in Hillsborough County, but the subject is also
one of public importance affecting numerous families in the
County. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the
statements made by Huerta were false or that they in any way
impeded the proper performance of his duties ....
[T]here is
nothing to suggest that the615
termination was justified in light of any
competing social interests.
In Martin v. Baugh,616 Martin worked for the City of Birmingham as a
communications technician who was concerned about the bidding process to
upgrade the City's communications system. 617 Martin shared his concerns
with a member of the City Council, Blake, and the Birmingham chapter of
the Fraternal Order of Police ("FOP"). 618 Later, Martin testified in a suit that
arose between two bidders over the city rigged bidding process. 619 Martin
never cleared his whistleblowing with his supervisor, Baugh.
Upon
learning of Martin's disclosures, Baugh accused Martin of insubordination
608.
(1982)).
609.
610.
611.
612.
613.
614.
615.
616.
617.
618.
619.
620.

Huerta, 7 20 So. 2d at 277 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
Id.
Id. at 278.
Id.
Id.
391 U.S. 563 (1968).
Huerta, 72:0 So. 2d at 278.
Id.

141 F.3d 1417 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 870 (1999).
Id. at 1419.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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and urged him to resign. 62 1 Martin also received a reprimand, and some of
his duties were assigned to a coworker. 6 22 Depressed by this turn of events,
Martin took a leave of absence. 6 Martin then sued the City, the Mayor, and
Baugh, alleging that his disclosures were protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. 624 Among other things, the district court ruled that
Baugh was not entitled to qualified immunity.
On appeal, the sole issue concerned Martin's claim for damages against
Baugh in his individual capacity.
To receive the protection of qualified
immunity, Martin must prove that his First Amendment right Baugh violated
was "clearly established" when Baugh disciplined him. 627 The court
concluded that Martin fell short of his burden on this issue.628 The court
pointed out that there is a presumption of qualified immunity, and Martin
had to prove that: 1) the speech touched on a matter of public concern; and
2) "the value of the speech outweighs its potential for disruption of
government workplace efficiency. 629
The court made clear that a defendant in a First Amendment suit would
"rarely be on notice that his actions are unlawful., 630 No authority suggests
that a person in Baugh's position would obviously have known that Martin's
speech was constitutionally protected. 631 It is almost impossible for a
reasonable person to judge before trial how a court will assess the array of
factors that go into whether speech is protected. 632 In sum, it was not plainly
manifest when Baugh disciplined Martin that his First Amendment rights
were being violated.
Baugh is entitled to qualified immunity.6 34
In Badia v. City of Miami,635 Badia worked for the City of Miami
Department of Public Works. 636 Among other claims, Badia alleged that the
City and Wally Lee, the former director of the department, violated her First
Amendment rights by retaliating against her after she filed a charge of
621.
622.
623.
624.
625.
626.

Martin, 141 F.3d at 1419.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1420.
Martin, 141 F.3d at 1418.

627. Id. at 1420.
628.
629.
630.
631.
632.
633.
634.
635.
636.

Id.
Id. (citing Goffer v. Marbury, 956 F.2d 1045, 1049 (11th Cir. 1992)).
Id.
Martin, 141 F.3d at 1420-21.
Id. at 1420.
Id. at 1421.
Id.
133 F.3d 1443 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1445.
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discrimination. 637 Lee claimed qualified immunity, but the district court
rejected Lee's claim, ruling that a genuine issue existed over whether
discrimination motivated Lee's treatment of Badia and the elimination of her
job.638 Lee appealed. 639
Badia's First Amendment claim came down to whether the "speech"
was a matter of public concern. 40 Precedent dictates that the court focus on
the "content, form, and context." 64 1 In the words of the court, "[i]f it is
unclear whether Badia's complaints were of the kind held to involve a matter
of public concern, then Lee's alleged actions did not violate clearly
established First Amendment rights and he is entitled to qualified
immunity." 642 Badia cites precedent that treats an employee's federal court
643
testimony in a discrimination suit as speech on a matter of public concern.
The court pointed to a split of authority over whether a formal employment
discrimination complaint rises to the level of speech on a matter of public
concern. 6 U In light of this lack of consensus on the issue, the right deemed
violated here could not have been clearly established for purposes of
qualified immunity. 64 5 In short, Lee's alleged actions did not violate clearly
established First Amendment rights, so he is entitled to qualified
immunity. W
In Morris v. Crow,64 7 the issue also turned on whether a public
employee's speech touched on a matter of public concern. 648 Deputy Sheriff
Morris was dismissed after an investigation into two incidents of
misconduct. 64 9 Morris claimed that he was terminated due to statements he
made in an accident report, and in his deposition testimony involving the
investigation of a codeputy's traffic accident, in which a citizen was
killed.- ° Morris's accident report mentioned that the officer was driving
over 130 miles per hour in a 50 miles per hour zone and that the officer

637.
638.
639.
640.
641.
642.
643.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Badia, 133 F.3d at 1445.
Id. (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983)).
Id.
Id. at 1446.

644. Id.
645.
646.
647.
648.
649.
650.

Badia, 133 F.3d at 1446.
Id.
142 F.3d 1379 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1381.
Id.
Id.
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failed to switch on "an emergency blue warning light in violation of sheriff's
office policy. 65 1
On appeal, the issue was whether Morris's speech can be "'fairly
characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern.' '' 652 The
Eleventh Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has yet to decide whether
"speech that occurs in the course of and as part of an employee's ordinary
duties is protected. 6 53 Relying on Eleventh Circuit precedent, the court
focused on "'whether the speech at issue was made primarily in the
employee's role as citizen, or primarily in the role of employee."' 65a Forced
to choose, the court concluded that Morris's report stemmed primarily from
his role as employee: "[tihere is nothing in the record to indicate that
Morris's purpose in writing the accident report was to bring to light any
wrongdoing or to do any more than accurately report an accident in the
course of his employment." 655 As for his deposition testimony, Morris was
subpoenaed to testify about the accident: "[t]he mere fact that Morris's
statements were made in the context of a civil deposition cannot transform
them into constitutionally protected speech." 656 For this reason, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that
65 7Morris's statements were not
protected speech under the First Amendment.
Gonzalez v. Lee County Housing AuthoritY 8 dealt with the same issue:
6 9
Whether public employee speech touched on a matter of public concern. 5
Specifically, whether a letter from an employee of a county housing
authority to her supervisor, claiming that she was forced to engage in
discriminatory housing practices, constituted speech on a matter of public
concern. 6 60 The Eleventh Circuit ruled that1 it did not; therefore, the
supervisor was entitled to qualified immunity.6

651. Id.
652. Morris, 142 F.3d at 1381 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)).
653. Id.
654. Id. at 1382 (quoting Morgan v. Ford, 6 F.3d 750, 755 (11th Cir. 1993)) (internal

citations omitted).
655.
656.
657.
658.
659.
660.
661.

Id
Id. at 1383.
Morris, 142 F.3d at 1383.
161 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1292.
Id. at 1293.
Id. at 1298.
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2. Freedom of Association
In Blanco v. City of Clearwater,662 Blanco was a police officer with the
Clearwater Police Department. 663
Blanco was discharged after an
investigation into whether he was involved in a long-term sexual relationship
with a seventeen-year-old girl. 664 Blanco was found to be in violation of a
department regulation which provides:
[N]o employee shall engage in conduct on or off-duty which
adversely affects the morale or efficiency of the department; nor
shall any employee engage in conduct on or off-duty which has a
tendency to destroy public respect for the employee and/or the
department and/or665 destroy confidence in the operation of the
municipal service.
In court, Blanco invoked his constitutional right to intimate association,
among other rights. 6 66 Again, whether some of the defendants were entitled
to qualified immunity turned on whether the law was clearly established that
an adult has a constitutional right to engage in a sexual relationship with a
minor. 667 At most, one earlier case ruled that "'dating is a type of association that must be protected by the First Amendment's freedom of
association. ' , 66 8 But, one case does not make for a clearly established
law;
66 9
therefore, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.
The Miami Herald recently reported on a case that holds out the
potential for implicating public employees' freedom of association. 67° In
January, 1999 thirty-one people were arrested in a police operation sting at a
private club where members took part in consensual sexual activities in front
of each other.67 1 Among the thirty-one arrested were two public high school
teachers who were suspended without pay by the Broward School Board on
August 3, 1999, pursuant to a state administrative rule that enables school
districts to discharge public employees "convicted of a crime involving

662. 9 F. Supp. 2d 1316 (M.D. Fla. 1998).
663. Id. at 1318.
664. Id.
665. Id. (quoting CLEARWATER, FLA., POLICE DEP'T reg. 213.15).
666. Id.
667. Blanco, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1319.
668. Id. (quoting Wilson v. Taylor, 733 F.2d 1539, 1543 (11 th Cir. 1984)).
669. Id.
670. Beth Reinhard & Daniel de Vise, Teachers in Sex Club Raid Suspended, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Aug. 4, 1999, at lB.
671. Id.
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moral turpitude." 672 The article pointed out that the case raises "questions
about whether the private lives of teachers should have any bearing on their
public roles in the classroom." 673 While some board members felt that the
teachers' dismissal amounted to an invasion of their privacy, another
claimed that it was permissible to "hold teachers to a high moral
standard. 674 In the face of public opinion critical of the board's discipline,
the board is weighing whether to take another vote. 675 News accounts cite
two earlier cases that frame the strict moral guidelines for teachers. 676 In
1981 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the revocation of teaching licenses of two
Lee County teachers for growing marijuana in their gardens. 677 Similarly, in
1975 the Eleventh Circuit sustained the termination of a Miami-Dade teacher
who was sexually abusing his stepdaughter.67
XI[. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
One unemployment compensation case involving a public employee
bears mention. In Philemy v. FloridaDepartmentof Health & Rehabilitative
Services,679 Philemy worked for HRS as a behavioral program associate.8 0 In
the course of her duties, Philemy discovered bruises on the back of a resi68168
dent.
The bruises looked like the imprint of a key.68 2 Although she wrote
down her observations, Philemy failed to report the abuse to the abuse
registry in accordance with HRS policy.683 After she was fired, Philemy
appealed her termination to PERC, which sustained the dismissal.
Later, Philemy applied for unemployment compensation. 6 8 At first, her
claim was approved since the claims examiner deemed that her termination
"was for reasons other than misconduct connected with work.' 686 HRS
672. Id.
673. Id.
674. Id.
675. Daniel de Vise & Connie Piloto, Teacher Discipline Sparks Big Outcry Board to
ReconsiderSex-Raid Suspensions,M HIHERAM (Broward), Aug. 5, 1999, at IA.
676. Beth Reinhard, Suspension of Two Teachers PromptsDebate, MAMI HERALD, Aug.
8, 1999, at lB.
677. Id.

678. Id.
679. 731 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
680. Id. at 65.

681.
682.
683.
684.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Philemy, 731 So. 2d at 65.
685. Id. at 66.

686. Id.
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appealed and the appeals referee concluded that Philemy was terminated for
misconduct relating to her job.6 87
On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed and reinstated
Philemy's unemployment compensation benefits. 688 Under Florida law,
"misconduct" that will disqualify a claimant is defined as:
(a) Conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an
employer's interests as is found in deliberate violation or disregard
of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect
of his or her employee; or
(b) Carelessness or negligence of such a degree or recurrence as
to manifest culpability, wrongful intent, or evil design or to show
an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests
or of the689employee's duties and obligations to his or her
employer.

All doubts must be resolved in favor of the claimant and the employer bears
the burden of proving misconduct. 69 A cause sufficient for job termination
is not invariably
misconduct that will bar unemployment compensation
benefits. 691.. Here, Philemy notified a coworker,
recorded her findmigs n a
log, and posted a note on the bulletin board recording her concerns. 69T Even
though she was negligent in failing to call the abuse registry and to notify
her supervisor, her negligence did not amount to misconduct for purposes of
unemployment compensation eligibility.6 93
Xm. PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICES, AND UNION ELECTIONS

On May 20, 1999 the Supreme Court of Florida handed down a
landmark decision embracing the fundamental right of government attorneys
to bargain collectively over the terms and conditions of their employment. 694
Back in 1993, the State Employees Attorneys' Guild ("SEAG") filed a
687. Id.
688. Id.
689. FLA. STAT. § 443.036(29) (1999).
690. Philemy, 731 So. 2d at 66 (citing McKnight v. Florida Unemployment Appeals
Comm'n, 713 So. 2d 1080, 1081 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
691. Id. at 66 (citing Betancourt v. Sun Bank Miami, N.A., 672 So. 2d 37, 38 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).

692. Id.
693. Id.
694. Chiles v. State Employees Attorneys Guild, 734 So. 2d 1030, 1033 (Fla. 1999)
[hereinafter "Chiles II"].
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petition with PERC, seeking certification as a bargaining unit of attorneys
who work for the State of Florida.695 PERC scheduled an evidentiary
hearing. 696 In response, the State asked the Supreme Court of Florida to stop
PERC from hearing SEAG's petition, arguing that only the state supreme
court could regulate the practice of law.6 The court refused to issue a writ
of prohibition because PERC is not a "court. ' 698 Two months later,
Governor Chiles signed into law a bill aimed at barring attorneys working
for the state from bargaining collectively. 699 In light of the new law, PERC
dismissed SEAG's petition. 70D The lawyers' union appealed PERC's
dismissal, calling into question the constitutionality of the new law. 0 The
SEAG brought suit in circuit
district court sustained PERC's dismissal .
court challenging the law's constitutionality under article I, section 6 of the
Florida Constitution.703 The circuit court struck down the law, ruling that it
to
70
lawyers
of government
t bargain c
encroached upon the right Appeal
affirmed.
of
Court
The First District
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida agreed that the new law was
unconstitutional. 706 The court relied on article I, section 6 of the Florida
Constitution, which is aimed at protecting the right of public employees to
bargain collectively, as evidence that the people of Florida had foreclosed
this debate. °7 In reaching this result, the court applied strict scrutiny
analysis under which the state must come forward with a compelling state
70 8
interest for denying government lawyers the right to bargain collectively.
Moreover, the law must achieve that "'compelling state interest in the least
intrusive means possible."' 709 The State argued that "government attorneys
695. Id. at 1031.
696. Id.
697. Id.
698. Id. (citing Chiles v. Public Employees Relations Comm'n, 630 So. 2d 1093, 1094
(Fla. 1994)).

699. "An act relating to public employees." Ch. 94-89, § 1, 1994 Fla. Laws 309, 310
(codified at FLA. STAT. § 447.203(3)G) (Supp. 1994)).
700. ChilesII, 734 So. 2d at 1032 (citing 20 F.P.E.R. 25151 (1994)).
701. Id.
702. Id. (citing State Employees Attorneys Guild v. State, 653 So. 2d 487,489 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1995)).
703. Id.
704. Id.
705. Chiles v. State Employees Attorneys Guild, 714 So. 2d 502,507-08 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1998) [hereinafter "Chiles r"], affd by 734 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 1999).

706. Chiles II, 734 So. 2d at 1036.
707. Id.
708. Id.
709. Id. at 1033 (quoting State Employees Attorneys Guild v. State, 653

So. 2d 487,

488 (Fla. lstDist. Ct. App. 1995)).
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must give complete confidentiality, fidelity and loyalty to the State and local
government while conducting its legal affairs. 71 0 In sum, according to the
State the personal nature of the attorney-client relationship would be undermined if the attorney were entitled to continuously sue the state to enforce
However, the court found
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.
that the State introduced no evidence that the law was needed to protect the
asserted state interest.712 No evidence supported the State's conclusion that
"government employed attorneys would abandon their ethical obligation of
confidentiality, fidelity and loyalty" by joining a labor union. 713 Moreover,
the experience of other states in which government lawyers are entitled to
bargain collectively has produced no "apparent harm to the attorney-client
relationship."" 4 Attorneys who work for the federal government also are
entitled to bargain collectively with no apparent ill effect.71 5
The State also claimed that collective bargaining would entail
compartmentalizing its legal staff to minimize the risk of conflict. 716 The
court's response was that such an administrative burden did not rise to the
level of a compelling state interest. 71 7 Moreover, the court ruled that
collective bargaining by state-employed lawyers did not infringe upon the
court's jurisdiction over lawyer discipline.
If other states are any guide,
collective bargaining can be framed to accommodate both the government's
interests in assuring loyalty and competence in their attorneys, and the
attorneys' constitutional right as public employees to bargain collectively."19
In support of this conclusion, the court cited the position of the American
Bar Association and of The Florida Bar Board of Governors, which
recognizes that attorney collective bargaining is not inherently incompatible
with the attorney-client relationship.72°- At the same time, the court warned
that the rules regulating The Florida Bar and a lawyer's duty of loyalty take
precedence over a lawyer's collective bargaining activities, and any breaches
will lead to discipline
by the court under article V, section 15 of the Florida
7 21
Constitution.

710.
711.
712.
713.
714.
715.
716.
717.
718.
719.

Id.
Chiles 11, 734 So. 2d at 1034.
Id. at 1034.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1034-35.
ChilesI,734 So. 2d at 1035.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1036.

720. Id. (citing MODELCODI

OFPROFESSIONALRESPONSiBIUTr

EC 5-13 (1980)).

721. ChilesI,734 So. 2d at 1037.
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An article in the Miami Herald reported that a public school teachers'
union filed a grievance over class sizes, and teachers at Western High School
followed the lead.722 The action was noteworthy since it was the first time
that the teachers' union filed a grievance over class size 723 School district
rules stipulate that, on average, teachers should handle no more than 198
students a day.724 For schools with block scheduling, classes that run twice
as long, the number is ninety-nine students.2 With an enrollment of 3675,
Western High School was running at double its capacity. 72 6 Although the
school added portable classrooms, the union claimed that the school violated
health and safety standards by crowding too many students into each
portable classroom.727 The issue of overcrowding came to a head at Walter
C. Young Middle School, but was settled when teachers agreed on extra pay
to teach additional classes. 728 As the School Board saw it, however, the
issue was not grievable since the collective bargaining agreement was silent
on the question of class size, unlike most contracts between school boards
and teachers' unions. 729
730
In City of Safety Harbor v. Communications Workers of America,
PERC had certified the Communications Workers of America ("CWA") as
the exclusive bargaining representative for a bargaining unit.731 According
to PERC, the bargaining unit, composed wholly of nonprofessional
employees, included the classification "Recreation Leaders
IL"even though
7 32
the parties regarded that classification as professional.
On appeal, PERC's ruling was reversed and the court ordered a new
election.
At issue was the proper interpretation of the statute defining the
term "professional employee." 7
The introductory clause of the statute
recites that a professional employee must be engaged in work "in any two or
more" of the following four enumerated categories.73 5 PERC read the fourth
722. Daniel De Vise, Broward Teachers Score on Crowding But Union Files New
Grievance, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Feb. 4, 1999, at IA.
723. Id.

724. Id.
725. Id.
726. Id.
727. DeVise, supra note 722, at 1A.

728.
729.
730.
731.
732.

Id.
Id.
715 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 266.
Id. (citing Communications Workers of Am. v. City of Safety Harbor, 22 F.P.E.R.

27125 (1996)).

733. Id.
734. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 447.203(13) (1995)).
735. FLA. STAT. § 447.203(13)(a) (1999). The four categories stated in the statute are:
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category of the definition, the "specialized intellectual instruction" category,
as a threshold requirement. 736 The court ruled that PERC's treatment of
section 447.203(13)(a)4 of the FloridaStatutes as a threshold was error.737
PERC's reliance on the analogous federal statute, the NLRA, 7 38 and the
analogous statutes of other states was ill advised.73 9 Unlike those statutes,
employees in Florida qualify as "professional" based on meeting "any two or
more" of the four listed criteria. 74° The other statutes omit this modifying
language. 741 Since Safety Harbor's Recreation Leaders II met the first two
criteria of 742section 447.203(13)(a), they qualified as "professional
employees."
Once PERC certifies a union as the exclusive bargaining representative
of a defined bargaining unit, the public employer and the union must bargain
in good faith over the terms and conditions of employment. 743 In Hillsborough Area Regional Transit Authority v. Amalgamated Transit Union
Local 1593,74 the Regional Transit Authority and the Transit Union filed
unfair labor practice charges with PERC. 745 After a hearing, PERC ruled
that the Transit Union had not bargained in bad faith.
The Transit
1. Work predominantly intellectual and varied in character as
opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work;
2.
Work involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment
in its performance;
3.
Work of such character that the output produced or the result
accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of time;
and
4. Work requiring advanced knowledge in a field of science or
learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized
intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher learning or a
hospital, as distinguished from a general academic education, an
apprenticeship, or training in the performance of routine mental or physical
processes.
Id.
736. City of Safety Harbor,715 So. 2d at 267.

737. Id.
738. 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1994) provides that a professional must be engaged in work
calling for knowledge of an advanced type ordinarily secured via higher education.
739. City of Safety Harbor,715 So. 2d at 267.

740. Id. at 267 (citing FLA. STAT. § 447.203(13)(a)).
741. Id. at 267-68.
742. Id. at 268.
743. See Hillsborough Area Reg'l Transit Auth. v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local
1593, 720 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
744. 720 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
745. Id. at 1161.
746. Id.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol24/iss1/4

60

Sanchez: Employment Law

1999]

Sanchez

Authority appealed. 747 The court sustained PERC's judgment that the
Transit Union had not bargained in bad faith74s "'[W]hether a party bargains in good or bad faith is a factual determination based on the circumstances of the particular case.' 74 9 Even in the face of evidence that may
support a contrary view, the court felt compelled to accept PERC's
conclusion.

XIV. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
A.

Section 1981

Section 1981 of title 42 of the United States Code, enacted to police the
Thirteenth Amendment, supports only claims allegin racial discrimination.75 ' In Jett v. Dallas Independent School District,7 the Supreme Court
ruled that § 1981 would not support a suit against a state employer.753 In
1991, however, Congress amended section 1981 by adding subsection (c),
making clear that "[t]he rights protected by this section are protected against
impairment by nongovernmental discrimination.' 754 A split has emerged
among the circuit courts over whether section 1981(c) statutorily overrules
Jett and opens up an implied private right of action against municipalities. 75 5
In Cason Enterprises, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County,
Cason
Enterprises, Inc. ("CEr') entered into a contract with the Miami-Dade Water
and Sewer Department for the purchase of bulk granular potassium
permanganate ("GPP") with an option by the County to purchase potassium
permanganate ("PP") in liquid form.7 57 Later, the County purchased drums
of dry PP from another supplier, claiming that CEI refused to sell PP in
drums. 758 In 1995 the County ordered GPP in bulk. 759 CEI was unable to

747. id.
748. Id.
749. Hillsborough,720 So. 2d at 1161 (quoting Duval County Sch. Bd. v. Florida Pub.

Employees
750.
751.
752.
753.
754.
755.
1998).

Relations Conm'n, 353 So. 2d 1244, 1248 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978)).
Id.
See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989).
491 U.S. 701 (1989).
Id. at 738.
42 U.S.C. § 1981(c) (1994).
See Cason Enters. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 20 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (S.D. Fla.

756. 20 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (S.D. Fla. 1998).

757. Id. at 1335.
758. Id.
759. Id. at 1336.
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supply the ordered bulk product.7 ° CEI was found to be in default and the
contract was canceled in 1996. 761 CEI sued the County for alleged violations
of section 1981 of title 42 of the United States, among other claims. 762 The
court ruled that "[p]roof of intentional discrimination is required in order to
establish liability under § 1981 .,,763 Moreover, "[1liability under § 1981 is
personal in nature and cannot be imposed vicariously. ' 7 4
B.

Title VII and Equal Protectionvia § 1983
1. Definition of Public Employer under Title VII

The Eleventh Circuit, in Lyes v. Riviera Beach,765 established a new test
to determine whether a public employer has the requisite number of
employees to fall within Title VII's coverage. 766 The court focused on "the
presumption that governmental subdivisions denominated as separate and
distinct under state law should not be aggregated for purposes of Title
' 76 7
VII."
.
This presumption, however, is rebuttable "where one entity exerts
or shares control over the fundamental aspects of the employment
relationships of another entity, to such a substantial extent that it clearly
outweighs the presumption that the entities are distinct., 768 Evidence of such
control includes: 1) interrelation of operations; 2) centralized control of
labor operations; 3) authority to hire, transfer, promote, discipline, or
discharge; and 4) the obligation to pay or the duty to train the plaintiff.769
2. National Origin Discrimination
National origin discrimination in the public sector can be challenged
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.770 In Buzzi v. Gomez,771 the
plaintiffs were former and current officers of the Metro-Dade Police
760.
761.
762.
763.
764.
765.
766.
767.
768.
769.
770.
771.

Id.
Cason, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1336.
Id. at 1337.
Id.
Id.
166 F.3d 1332 (11 th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
Id. at 1345.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Buzzi v. Gomez, 24 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
24 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
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Department ('MDPD").7 72 The plaintiffs claimed that their former supervisor, Lieutenant Gomez, a Cuban-American male, hatched a scheme to
systematically transfer them from, or sometimes, bar their transfer into,
assignments at the Airport District because they were not Cuban, while
employing less qualified Cuban transferees. 773 Gomez was also accused of
harassing non-Cuban officers from the Airport District to force their
transfers to other districts.7 74 The Air4 ,ort District is a coveted assignment,
posing low risk and much overtime.
Plaintiffs claimed that they were
victims of national origin discrimination by virtue of their non-Cuban
heritage, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 776 Defendant Carlos Alvarez was also sued because,
as the
777
Assistant Director of the MDPD, he did not remedy the situation.
Eventually, Division Chief Paull met with• Buzzi,
• • who
778 related evidence
of a hostile environment on grounds of national origin.
The Professional
Compliance Bureau ("PCB") conducted an investigation, which led to
Alvarez removing Gomez from his post.779 PCB's report sustained several of
the allegations, concluding that Gomez had acted unprofessionally and that
he failed at times to follow standard procedures for transfers. 78 PCB's
report stopped short of accusing Gomez of national origin discrimination.7 l
PCB did not investigate Alvarez.782 Dissatisfied with PCB's report, the
plaintiffs filed charges of discrimination with the EEOC, which led to a §
1983 suit being filed
in federal court, naming Gomez and Alvarez, among
783
other defendants.
The court framed the issue as whether Alvarez was entitled to qualified
immunity from plaintiffs' § 1983 suit.78 4 Violations of § 1983 occur when a
person acting "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State... subjects ... any citizen.., to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." 765

772. Id. at 1355.
773. Id.

774. Id.
775. Id.
776. Buzzi, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 1355.

777. Id.
778. Id. at 1357.

779. Id.
780.
781.
782.
783.
784.

Id.
Buzzi, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 1357.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 1358.

785. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
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Proof of a violation requires a showing of intent.786 "A defendant may be
liable only for an affirmative act or 'deliberate indifference' to a risk where
the deprivation of a federal right is a 'plainly obvious consequence' of the
defendant's inaction. ,,787 The court concluded that Alvarez was entitled to
qualified immunity as a matter of law.788
The Supreme Court framed the test for judging whether a public official
is entitled to qualified immunity. 789 "'[G]overnment officials ...generally
are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known. ' ' ' 79 0
A government official
performing discretionary functions is shielded if "'a reasonable official
could have believed his or her conduct to be lawful in light of clearly
established law and the information possessed by the official at the time the
conduct occurred.' ' 79 1 Entitlement to immunity is the rule, not the
exception.7 92 The Eleventh Circuit's formulation of the test is two-fold.793
"First, the defendant must prove that he was acting within the scope of his
discretionary authority" when the misconduct occurred. 9 If the defendant
satisfies this prong, then the plaintiff must prove that the defendant "violated
clearly established law based upon objective standards," in other words, that
the plaintiff's rights were so clear that a reasonable government official
would have understood that his acts violated the plaintiffs rights.795
Applying this test, the court concluded that Alvarez acted in his
discretionary authority so the burden shifted to the plaintiffs, who failed to
meet their burden of demonstrating that Alvarez "'violated clearly
established constitutional law."' 79 6 In short, the plaintiffs failed to show that
when Alvarez failed to act, the "law was developed in such a concrete and
factually defined context to make it obvious to all reasonable government
'797
actors, in Alvarez's place, that what he was doing violated federal law.
786. Buzzi, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 1359.
787. Id. (quoting Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 398 (1997)).
788. Id. at 1359.
789. Id.
790. Id. at 1359-60 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
791. Buzzi, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 1360 (quoting Hardin v. Hayes, 957 F.2d 845, 848 (11th
Cir. 1992)).
792. Id.
793. Id.
794. Id. (citing Hartsfield v. Lemacks, 50 F.3d 950, 953 (11 th Cir. 1995)).
795. Id. (citing Swint v. City of Wadley, 51 F.3d 988, 995 (11th Cir. 1995)).
796. Buzzi, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 1360 (quoting Sammons v. Taylor, 967 F.2d 1533, 1539
(11th Cir. 1992)).
797. Id. (citing Braddy v. Florida Dep't of Labor & Employment Sec., 133 F.3d 797,
801 (11th Cir. 1998)).
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The evidence demonstrated that once Alvarez received concrete information
of a hostile environment at the Airport District, he immediately authorized
an investigation. 798 When the fruits of the investigation pointed out
misconduct, he "summarily relieved Gomez of his command." 799 Without
some case precedent holding that an official, akin to Alvarez, had a duty to
halt the transfers of personnel, Alvarez enjoyed discretion to decide whether
plaintiffs' grievances required his immediate attention. 800 For Alvarez to
lose his immunity, it would have to be demonstrated that his "'acts or
omissions were the cause-not 80 merely
a contributing factor-of the
1
constitutionally infirm condition."'
3. Relationship Between Title VII and § 1983 Claims
In Johnsonv. City of Fort Lauderdale,8 2 Johnson, an African-American
male, worked for the City of Fort Lauderdale Fire Department. 803 In 1994,
Johnson sued the City, a former Fire Chief, and four supervisors under Title
VII, and §§ 1981 and 1983, alleging an equal protection violation, and
claiming racial harassment, discrimination, and retaliation. 8°4 In response,
the defendants argued that the Civil Rights Act of 1991805 left
80 6 Title VII as
the sole remedy for public sector employment discrimination.
The Eleventh Circuit surveyed the views of other courts on whether the
1991 Act left Title VII and § 1981 as the exclusive remedies for public
sector employment discrimination. 807 The Fourth Circuit and several district
courts have rejected defendants' argument that such exclusivity is implied
from 1) "the Act's inclusion of a savings clause related to § 1981" and
conscious exclusion of an analogous savings clause for § 1983; and 2) the
Act's overall remedial scheme.
Turning to the Act's legislative history,
the court pointed out that while the language is ambiguous at best, the fairest

798. Id. at 1361.
799. Id.
800. Id.
801. Buzzi, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 1362 (quoting LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1538
(lth Cir. 1993)).
802. 148 F.3d 1228 (llth Cir. 1998).
803. Id. at 1229.

804. Id.
805. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 2 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1993)).
806. Johnson, 148 F.2d at 1229.
807. Id.
808. Id. (citing Beardsley v. Webb, 30 F.3d 524, 527 (4th Cir. 1994); Stoner v.
Department of Agric., 846 F. Supp. 738,740-41 (W.D. Wis. 1994)).
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conclusion is that Congress did not intend to limit § 1983's scope. 8°9 In
short, the omission "sheds little light" on Confress's aim to preserve or
preempt § 1983 remedies for municipal workers. I° In support of its ruling
the court noted that the legislative history of Title VII evinces congressional
intent to preserve, not to preempt, "§ 1983 as a parallel remedy for
unconstitutional public sector employment discrimination. ' 8" In light of
this conclusion, the court affirmed the district court's order denying the
defendants' motion to dismiss Johnson's § 1983 claims.8 12
4. Relationship Between Title VII and Collective Bargaining
In United States v. City of Hialeah,813 the federal government accused
the City of Hialeah of discrimination against African-Americans in hiring
firefighters and police officers in violation of Title VII.814 The parties
entered into a consent decree including a provision granting retroactive
competitive seniority to thirty new African-American workers. 815 The
district court refused to approve this part of the consent decree because it
would violate contractual seniority rights of the incumbent employees, rights
enshrined in the parties' collective bargaining agreements. 8 16 This case can
be framed as an effort to adopt affirmative action via a consent decree that is
blocked by claims of reverse discrimination. 1 7
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that affirmative remedial
goals cannot be achieved in a consent decree proceeding if rights of a
nonconsenting third party are affected. 818 Before such affirmative action can
be adopted there must be a trial on the merits or a valid summary
judgment.813 A prima facie case of discrimination alone will not warrant
depriving an objecting party's right to a full adjudication of its arguments on
the merits in a trial. 82 One party to a collective bargaining agreement cannot
rely on a nonconsensual Title VII consent decree to relieve itself of its

809.
810.
1994)).
811.
812.
813.
814.

Id. at 1230.
Id. (quoting Stoner v. Department of Agric., 846 F. Supp. 738, 741 (W.D. Wis.
Johnson, 148 F.3d at 1230.
Id. at 1231.
140 F.3d 968 (llth Cir. 1998).
Id. at 971.

815. Id.
816.
817.
818.
819.
820.

Id.
Id.
City of Hialeah, 140 F.3d at 975.
Id. at 977.
Id. at 978.
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obligations, which the other party negotiated and bargained to secure.821 At
the same time, the court made clear that if a Title VII violation is found after
trial, collectively bargained seniority rights may have to be modified as part
of the remedy.8s
5. Affirmative Action
Court ordered affirmative action in the form of a consent decree was the
subject of an article in the Miami Herald.8 2 Twenty-two years ago, the City
of Miami was ordered by a federal court to improve its record in hiring and
promoting minorities in its work force.8 24 In response, the city rewrote its
hiring and promotion exams to eliminate racial bias.
In addition, the City
adopted rules that accorded lower ranked minorities oppfortunities to fill
vacancies that would otherwise go to non-Hispanic whites.
In 1999, the United States Justice Department urged a federal judge to
end the court order in light of the fact that today, roughly
half
of
827Miami's
•
•
employees are Hispanic and thirty percent are African-American.
As for
the police department, the court would continue to oversee exams for the
ranks of captain and below for about a year.82 Departments other than
police and fire departments have dropped exams for29hiring and promotions
altogether, relying on more flexible hiring practices.8
Ward Connerly, who spearheaded the campaign to end affirmative
action in government hiring in California, has turned his attention to
Florida.83 According to a New York Times article, Connerly hopes to amend
the Florida Constitution to bar affirmative action that is based on race, sex,
or ethnicity, in government hiring and contracts.831 The article cited a poll
showing that eighty-four percent of over 600 voters reached by telephone
would vote for a ban on affirmative action. 32 To get his initiative on the

821. Id. at 983.

822. Id.
823. Tyler Bridges, U.S. Moves to Lift City of Miami Hiring Order, MIAMI
Apr. 12, 1999, at lB.

HERALD,

824. Id.
825. Id.
826. Id.

827. Id.
828. Bridges, supra note 823, at lB.

829. Id.
830. Rick Bragg, Affirmative Action Ban Meets a Wall in Florida,N.Y. TIMES, June 7,

1999, at A16.
831. Id.
832. Id.
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ballot next year, Connerly must sign up 430,000 registered voters. 833 Next
the Supreme Court of Florida must review the proposed ballot language.
Governor Jeb Bush, a critic of the measure, dismissed Connerly's crusade as
divisive. s3 5 According to the Miami Herald, however, retirees from
Homestead and Margate have added their support to building contractors
836
who favor the measure.
Meanwhile, according to an editorial in the Miami Herald, the MiamiDade County Commission voted in February, 1999 to reaffirm a minority
set-aside program for professional contracts.8 37 Citing Supreme Court precedent eroding the legal grounds for minority set-asides, the editorial warned
that "20-year-old set-aside programs must be adapted to today's realities." 38
An article in the Miami Herald also reported that eleven AfricanAmerican city employees sued the City of Fort Lauderdale, alleging that they
were denied promotions on account of their race.839 The lawsuit claims that
the City promoted three white males in the Public Works Department over
senior African-American workers.8 °
6. Sex Discrimination and Sexual Harassment
In May 1999, five female law professors resigned from Florida State
University's law school, alleging sexual harassment.941 According to the
Miami Herald, one of the professors claimed that "harassment is tolerated on
several levels at the
school" although the women did not single out any
42
particular person.8
An editorial in the Miami Herald reviewed claims of sexual harassment
among Pembroke Pines city employees. 3 The editorial criticized the city
for allowing accused harassers to retire.8 4 It also urged cities to create
"clear channels for reporting harassment, quick investigations and discipline

833. Id.
834. Id.
835. Bragg, supra note 830, at A16.
836. Lesley Clark, Retirees Join Fight vs. Affirmative Action, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), July 14, 1999, at 10B.
837. Editorial, A Phyrrhic Victory, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 8, 1999, at 10A.
838. Id.
839. Brad Bennett, Workers Accuse Fort Lauderdale of Racial Bias, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), July 15, 1999, at lB.
840. Id.
841. FSU ProfessorsCite Harassment,MIAMI HERALD, May 8, 1999, at 5B.
842. Id.
843. Editorial, The Toll of Harassment,MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 4, 1999, at 28A.
844. Id.
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of offenders," otherwise, they 45
would have to continue paying out public
funds to settle harassment suits.
While not a public employment case, the Blockbuster hair length case
arose in South Florida and only ended when the Supreme Court refused to
review the case.846 Four men claimed that Blockbuster singled them out
because of their hair length.847 Left intact was the Eleventh Circuit's rulin
that different hair length rules for men and women do not violate Title VII.
Blockbuster's policy required male employees to wear their hair within two
inches of their collar, while women's hair length went unregulated.849 In the
past, the Supreme Court has sustained grooming standards for police
850 officers
who were not permitted to wear facial hair or wear their hair long.
In Department of Business & Professional Regulation v. Balaguer,51
Ray Balaguer and a woman were finalists for a promotion to the rank of
sergeant in the Department's Division of Alcoholic Beverages and
Tobacco.852 After Balaguer was passed over for the promotion, he filed a
petition with the Commission on Human Relations, claiming gender and age
discrimination. 853 After an administrative hearing, the law judge ("AL")
found that the Department had committed unlawful gender discrimination
and the Commission adopted this judgment as its own, ordering the4
Department to stop discriminating and to promote Balaguer to sergeant.
On appeal, the court made clear that it would not disturb the ALl's findings
unless they were clearly erroneous. 5 After reviewing the record, the court
concluded that there was no evidentiary support for the AL's critical
findings of fact.85 6
In Hazel v. School Board of Dade County,8 57 Hazel served as Student
Clarke became
Activities Director for Northwestern High School. 8
Principal in 1995.859 Hazel claimed that Clarke sexually harassed her by
845. Id.
846. Harper v. Blockbuster Ent. Corp., 139 F.3d 1385 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119
S. Ct. 509 (1998); see also Elaine Walker, Supreme Court Won't HearBlockbuster Hair-Length
Case, MMI

HaA,

Nov. 17, 1998, at C1.

847. Harper,139 F.3d at 1386.
848. Id. at 1387.
849. Walker, supra note 846, at Cl.
850. Kelly v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
851. 729 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).

852. Id. at 537.
853. Id.
854. Id.
855.
856.
857.
858.
859.

Id.
Balaguer,729 So. 2d at 538.
7 F. Supp. 2d 1349 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
Id. at 1351.
Id.
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making comments about her physical appearance, staring at her in a sexual
manner, and propositioning her for sex.
Hazel also claimed that Clarke
threatened that she would regret not having sex with him. 86 After putting
him off multiple times, Hazel alleged that Clarke retaliated against her by
eliminating her job and reassigning her other duties to other teachers without
informing Hazel. 862 Later, Hazel shared her concerns with a former principal
of the school, Koonce. 863 As a School Board administrator, Koonce spoke
with Clarke about Hazel's allegations.' 64 Clarke was also accused by other
female employees of sexual harassment. 865 The School Board never talked
to Hazel about her grievance or disciplined Clarke. 866 Hazel claimed that
Clarke stepped up his harassment after he learned that she had
complained. 7 In 1996, Clarke demoted Hazel (involuntarily transferred her
to a classroom teaching position) even though she had received the highest
possible performance rating the year before.
Later, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission allowed Hazel
to bring suit against the School Board and Clarke, in his individual
869
capacity.
The district in
court
focused
on themust
prima
facie
case for "quid pro
quo sexual harassment,"
which
a plaintiff
show
that:
(1) the employee belongs to a protected class; (2) the employee
was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment
complained of was based on sex; (4) the employee's reaction to the
harassment complained of affected tangible aspects of the
employee's compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of
87
employment; and (5) respondeat superior. 0
The court noted that quid pro quo sexual harassment can be explicit or
implicit. 87 1 The closer the connection "between a discussion about job
benefits and a request for sexual favors, the more likely that there has been

860. Id.

861. Id.
862. Hazel, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1351.
863. Id.

864. Id.
865. Id. at 1352.
866. Id.

867.
868.
869.
870.
1982)).

Hazel, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1352.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1353 (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 (1Ith Cir.

871. Id.
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an 'implicit' conditioning by the harasser." 72 Also relevant is how often the
advances were made, the length of time over which the advances took place,
and the strength of the connection between the advances and the discussion
of job benefits or detriments.873 After weighing all of these factors, the court
concluded that Hazel made out a prima facie case of quid pro quo sexual
harassment under Title VII.874 On Hazel's Title IX claim, however, the court
ruled that Title VII is the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination
claims on grounds of sex in federally funded educational institutions. s75
had failed to state a § 1983 claim against
Finally, the court held that Hazel 876
the School Board or the principal.
7. Religious Discrimination
Religious discrimination in the workplace may be contested under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") 877 under Title VII, and under
both prosN s of the First Amendment, as free speech and as free exercise of
religion.
This array of challenges were all cogently analyzed in Gunning
v. Runyon,87980a case involving a federal employee working in Florida. 80 In
Gunning, the postal employees voted in favor of playing a Christian radio
station over the station loudspeakers, but the post office turned off the
station radio altogether and instead allowed
employees to wear headsets or
1
have small radios at their workstation.88
Gunning went to federal court, challenging the post office's decision to
turn off the religious radio station under Title VII, the First Amendment, and
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.112 Under Title VII, the court
analyzed Gunning's claim under both the disparate treatment framework and
the reasonable accommodation framework.9s 3 To establish a prima facie
case of disparate treatment discrimination, plaintiff must show that "(1) he is
a member of or practices a particular religion; (2) he is qualified to perform
the job at issue; (3) he has suffered some adverse employment action; and
(4) someone outside the protected class of which he is a member was treated
872. Hazel, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1353.
873. Id.

874. Id.
875.
876.
877.
878.

Id.
Id. at 1355.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (1994).
See Gunning v. Runyon, 3 F. Supp. 2d 1423 (S.D. Fla. 1998).

879. Id.
880. Id. at 1425-26.
881. Id. at 1426.
882. Id.
883. Gunning, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1427.
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differently. '' 88 Gunning failed to meet the third element because he
introduced no evidence as to any adverse employment action under Title
VI. 885 "Inconvenience and loss of enjoyment of life ... are not cognizable
under Title VII absent some adverse employment action.
Even if
Gunning could make out a prima facie case, allowing employees to use
walkmans, and other private listening devices, constitutes a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory rationale that rebuts the presumption of discrimination. 887
As for the reasonable accommodation framework under Title VII, a
plaintiff's prima facie case entails: "(1) a bona fide religious belief conflicting with an employment requirement; (2) that he informed his employer of
the religious belief; and (3) that he was discharged or otherwise penalized
for failure to comply with the conflicting requirement." 888 The court found
that Gunning established none of these elements because listening to
Christian music was not a tenet of his religion, he did not notify his
employer of such belief, and he did not suffer any adverse employment
action. 889 Moreover, even assuming Gunning made out a prima facie case,
allowing employees to wear headphones "constitute[s] a reasonable religious
accommodation under Title VII."'
The Post Office argued that Gunning's First Amendment freedom of
religion claim was precluded by Title VII.
The court agreed, citing Brown
v. General Services Administration,89 where the Supreme Court ruled that
Title VII is the exclusive remedy for federal employment discrimination.893
For this reason, Gunning's properly cognizable "constitutional claim of
religious
employment discrimination... [was] cognizable only under Title
8 94
VII.

,

Turning to Gunning's free speech claim, the court concluded that it was
not precluded by Title VII since it was not an employment discrimination
claim.895 Adopting public forum analysis, the court ruled that the Post
Office was a non-public forum, the most restricted, where the employer is
free to make distinctions in access on the basis of subject matter and speaker
884. Id. at 1428 (citing Mann v. Frank, 7 F.3d 1365, 1370 (8th Cir. 1993)).
885. Id.
886. Id. at 1429.
887. Id.
888. Gunning, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1429-30 (citing Beadle v. Hillsborough County
Sheriff's Dep't, 29 F.3d 589, 592 (11 th Cir. 1994)).
889. Id. at 1430.
890. Id.
891. Id.
892. 425 U.S. 820 (1976).
893. Brown, 425 U.S. at 835.
894. Gunning, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1431.
895. Id.
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identity, so long as they are "reasonable in light of the purpose served by the
forum and are viewpoint neutral."896 Applying this framework, the court
found that music interferes with an orderly and productive workplace environment and that the decision to deny access to the public address system
for recreational music was reasonable in light of the purpose of the postal
service.Y Moreover, the decision was not viewpoint based, that is, it was
not based upon the employer's opposition to the message of the music.8 98 In
effect, the government has the right simply to close the forum altogether. 899
The RFRA restored the "compelling interest" test as the appropriate
method for analysis of free exercise claims.m Although the Supreme Court
struck down the RFRA as unconstitutional as applied to the states,9°1 and
even though its constitutionality as applied to the federal government is far
from clear, the court assumed, for purposes of analysis, that the Act was
valid. 9°2 To establish a claim under RFRA, the plaintiff must prove that "he
possesses a religious belief and ... that governmental action or regulation
imposes a burden on the free exercise of his religion." 9 3 If so, the burden
shifts to thf government to come up with a compelling state interest for the
regulation.
Listening to Christian radio is not a tenet of Gunning's Baptist
faith, nor would failure to listen to the radio station burden the practice of
his faith.9 5 Indeed, Gunning is still free to listen to the radio station of his
choice via headphones. 9°w But, even if Gunning makes out a prima facie case
under the Act, the Post Office's interest in avoiding a violation of the
Establishment Clause constitutes a compelling state interest sufficient to
rebut Gunning's prima facie case.Y

896. Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.
788, 806 (1985) (internal quotations omitted)).
897. Id.

898. Id. at 1432.
899.
900.
90i.
902.
903.

Gunning, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1432.
Id. at 1433 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (1994)).
See generallyCity of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
Gunning, 3 F. Sjpp. 2d a. 1432-33.
Id. at 1433.

904. Id.
905. Id.
906. Id.
907. See Gunning, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1433.
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C. Age and DisabilityDiscrimination
1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act
In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,9°8 the only issue before the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and now before the Supreme Court which
heard oral argument in October, 1999, is whether Congress properly
abrogated the states' sovereign immunity when it passed the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") 99 and the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA"). 91 ° Two district courts have ruled that Congress
properly overrode the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity for both Acts,
but one district court granted the State's motion to dismiss on Eleventh
Amendment grounds.912
In Seminole Tribe v. Florida, the Supreme Court ruled that
Congress's power to abrogate exists only under section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 913 not pursuant to the Commerce Clause. 914 In light
of this case, the Kimel court set out two elements that must be met before
Eleventh Amendment immunity may be abrogated: 1) Congress must spell
out "a clear legislative statement" of its intent by "'making its intention
unmistakably clear in the language of the statute,"' and 2) Congress must
have invoked its enforcement
powers granted in section five of the
915
Fourteenth Amendment.
As for the ADEA, the court sidestepped the second element because the
Act does not satisfy the first prong: the lack of unmistakably clear
legislative intent. 9 16 Although a weak case of intent can be stitched together
908. 139 F.3d 1426 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 901 (1999), and cert.
grantedby 119 S. Ct. 902 (1999), andpetition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3177 (U.S. Sept.
28, 1999) (No. 98-791, 98-796).
909. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994).
910. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12, 101-12,213 (1994).
911. MacPherson v. University of Montevallo, 938 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. Ala. 1996),
aff'd by Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119
S. Ct. 901 (1999), and cert. grantedby 119 S.Ct. 902 (1999), and petition for cert.filed, 68
U.S.L.W. 3177 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1999) (No. 98-791, 98-796).
912. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
913. The enforcement provision in section five of the Fourteenth Amendment states:
"The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
914. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 57-73 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
915. Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1430 (quoting Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 62-63 (1996)).
916. Id. at 1431.
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from disparate language in the Act, the court made clear: "For abrogation to
be unmistakably clear, it should not first be necessary to fit together various
sections of the statute to create an expression from which one might infer an
intent to abrogate. '91 7 The words "the Eleventh Amendment or the States'
sovereign immunity" cannot be found anywhere in the ADEA.918 Even in
the face of Eleventh Amendment immunity, however, the court pointed out
that there
are forms of relief, other than direct suits by citizens in federal
9 19
coUrt.

By contrast, the ADA contains a clear statement of intent to abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity: "'A State shall not be immune under the
eleventh amendment... ."'m
Moreover, unlike the ADEA, it is also
manifest from the face of the statute itself, that Congress relied upon its
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers when it enacted the ADA: one
purpose of the act was "to invoke the sweep of congressional authority,
including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment." 921 In sum, the
ADA satisfies both elements for abrogation to prevail, while the ADEA
cannot even pass muster under the first element. Chief Judge Hatchett wrote
in his separate opinion that he believed that Congress abrogated the states'
sovereign immunity in both Acts, 9"2 while Circuit Judge Cox took the exact
opposite position, concluding that Congress lacked constitutional power to
abrogate the states' immunity under either Act.9
2. The Overlap Between the ADEA and § 1983
In Hornfeld v. City of North Miami Beach,924 Hornfeld was a sixty-year
old woman who had worked for the City for ten years. 9' In 1996, John
Asmar, Hornfeld's supervisor, cut back on Hornfeld's job duties, driven by
an imminent downsizing by the City. m Asmar offered plaintiff an early
retirement incentive package.927 Plaintiff claimed that she had no time to
weigh her options and accepted the package because she was told that she
would be discharged if she turned it down and that a younger, less

917. Id.

918. See id.
919.
920.
921.
922.
923.
924.
925.
926.
927.

Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1431.
Id. at 1433 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (1994)).
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994).
Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1434 (Hatchett, C.., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Id. at 1444 (Cox, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
29 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
Id. at 1361.
Id.

Id.
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experienced employee would take over her job.928 Plaintiff brought both a9
1983 claim, alleging a violation of equal protection, and an ADEA claim.930
The City contested plaintiff s entitlement to raise the two claims together.
The federal district court framed the issue as whether the ADEA served
as plaintiff's exclusive remedy. 931 In ruling that plaintiff was entitled to
bring both actions, the court relied on Supreme Court precedent "disfavoring
repeals by implication. 932 According to the Supreme Court, "[i]mplicit
repeals of statutory rights are recognized only 'when the earlier and later
statutes are irreconcilable.' ' 933 For example, the weight of authorityholds
that claims arising under Title VII may complement § 1983 claims.
The
court pointed out that Title VII is the law that "most closely parallels the
ADEA. 93 5 By contrast, Congress expressly spelled out that the ADEA
936 is
the exclusive remedy for federal employees alleging age discrimination.
Even so, plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that her ADEA claim
is "not91,937
based on the same substantive rights as her concurrent § 1983
claim.
In other words, to maintain both claims, plaintiff must aim at protecting independently conferred rights.938 In this regard, the court pointed to
differences between ADEA and equal protection rights: "[u]nilke the ADEA,
not all arbitrary treatment is deemed to offend the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although the clause protects against age discrimination, the elderly are not a
suspect class, and governmental action that disadvantages them is constitutional if it passes the rational basis test. 9 39 Moreover, under equal protection, "class membership is irrelevant in assessing an ADEA violation."
Thus, the court concluded that the ADEA and § 1983 "may be used as com-

928. Id.
929. Homfeld, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1360.
930. Id. at 1362-63.
931. See id.
932. Id. at 1363 (citing Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 442
(1987)).
933. Id. (quoting St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S.
772, 788 (1981)).
934. E.g., Johnson v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 148 F.3d 1228, 1231 (1lth Cir. 1998).
935. Hornfeld, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1365 (quoting EEOC v. Elrod, 674 F.2d 601, 607
(7th Cir. 1982) (internal quotations ommitted)).
936. Id. at 1365 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 633(a)). But Congress implicitly left other
remedies open to non-federal employees. Id.
937. Id. (citing Johnson, 114 F.3d at 1091).
938. See id.
939. Hornfeld, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1367.
940. Id. at 1368 (citing O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308
(1996)).
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plementary
forms of relief for employment discrimination in the public
94 1
sector.,
3. Adapting Title VII's Burden Shifting Framework to ADEA Cases
In Bogle v. Orange County Board of County Commissioners,9 42 a
former correction officer sued the county, his former employer, for age
discrimination in violation of the ADEA and the Florida Human Rights Act
of 1992.943 Given that plaintiff's case of age bias was wholly circumstantial,
the court adopted Title VII's McDonnell Douglasburden shifting framework
to
weigh plaintiff's
claim.944 The prima facie case of age
discrimination
consists ADEA
of showing:
(1) that he was a member of the protected group of persons
between the ages of forty and seventy; (2) that he was subject to an
adverse employment action; (3) that a substantially younger person
filled the position... from which he was discharged; and
945 (4) that
he was qualified to do the job for which he was rejected.
If plaintiff met this burden, the county then had to come up with a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its decision to fire the correction officer.94 6 In
this regard, the county introduced previous disciplinary sanctions and
plaintiff's failure to comply with several policies and procedures.947 After
the county met its burden, the plaintiff had to show that the county's
proffered reasons were pretextual. 948 On this score, the court ruled that
plaintiff lost because he failed to come up with any evidence that would have
entitled a reasonable jury to disbelieve the county's grounds for plaintiff's
termination. 949
In Mize v. School Board,950 plaintiff worked as a teacher of industrial
9
arts.
In 1996, plaintiff was told that he would not be re-appointed for the
941. Hornfeld, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1368.
942. 162F.3d 653 (lth Cir. 1998).
943. FLA. STAT. § 760.10 (1999).
944. Bogle, 162 F.3d at 656 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1983)).
945. Id. at 656-67 (quoting Turlington v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 135 F.3d 1428, 1432
(1998) (alteration in original), reh'g denied, 144 F.3d 57 (11th Cir. 1998), and cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 405 (1998)).
946. Id. at 657.
947. Id.

948. Id. at 658.
949. Bogle, 162 F.3d at 661.
950. 10 F. Supp. 2d 1314 (M.D. Fla. 1998).

Published by NSUWorks, 1999

77

Nova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 4

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 24:73

1996-1997 school year in light of low student enrollment in the engineering
classes in the drafting department.95 2 He was, however, put on a countywide
relocation list and indeed was offered a job teaching art to kindergarten
classes and elementary students, even though he never taught these levels
before. 953 Mize sued his former employer under the ADEA, under Florida's
Civil Rights Act of 1992,954 and under an alleged breach of the collective
95 6
bargaining agreement. 95 The court only addressed the ADEA claim.
The federal district court spelled out the prima facie case for age
discrimination when the plaintiff was not replaced. The plaintiff must show:
(1) that he was in a protected age group and was adversely affected
by an employment decision, (2) that he was qualified for his current
position or to assume another position at the time of the discharge,
and (3) evidence by which a fact finder could reasonably conclude
that the employer intended
to discriminate on the basis of age in
957
reaching that decision.
Except for this departure from the Mcdonnell Douglas framework, the Title
VII burden shifting analysis is the same.958 Here, since it was not clear
which test to apply,959 the court first applied the McDonnell Douglas
96 °
analysis, concluding that plaintiff met his burden on all four elements.
Alternatively, the court applied the Jamison framework and found that
plaintiff failed to prove the third element, and thus defendant was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.961 Under either framework, the employer was
able to meet its burden of supplying a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the reassignment,9 62 and plaintiff fell short of his burden of proving that

951. Id. at 1316.
952. Id.
953. Id.
954. FLA. STAT. § 760.10(1) (1999).
955. Mize, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 1316.
956. Id. at 1318. Since the other claims were matters of state law, the court dismissed
them for lack of federal jurisdiction, after dismissing the ADEA claim. Id.
957. Id. at 1317 (citing Jameson v. Arrow Co., 75 F.3d 1528, 1532 (11th Cir. 1996)).
958. See id.
959. Id. The confusion arose due to a factual dispute over whether plaintiff's position
was eliminated. Id.
960. Mize, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 1317. The court assumed that reassignment or demotion
counts as a termination under this framework. Id.
961. Id. at 1318.
962. Id. at 1317.
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963
defendant's
reasons
were a under
pretext.
964 School Board
was entitled stated
to summary
judgment
either Therefore,
framework.the

4. Disability Discrimination
In Bledsoe v. Palm Beach County Soil & Water Conservation
District,965 Bledsoe worked as a resource technician for four years until he

was dismissed in 1992. 966 During his tenure with the Palm Beach County
Soil & Water Conservation District ("District"), Bledsoe injured his knee
and filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits.967 At the same time,
he asked his supervisor to accommodate his inability to walk for long
stretches. 968 As an accommodation, the District offered Bledsoe a job as
resource conservationist, but he declined the offer, so the District fired
him. 96 9 As part of the settlement of his workers' compensation claim,
Bledsoe waived his rights to sue his employer for
970 any other claims, except
for future medicals, attorneys' fees, and the like.
Nevertheless, Bledsoe sued the District and Palm Beach County under
the ADA, claiming a disability and alleging that his employer's refusal to
accommodate his disability (his inability to walk for long distances) was the
reason for his termination. 971 In defense, the District raised Bledsoe's
release executed as part of his claim for workers' compensation benefits. 972
The district court ruled that the County was not Bledsoe's employer but
litigation continued against the District alone.9 3 The court ruled that the
District fell short of the minimum number of employees required to be
covered under Title I of the ADA, so Bledsoe amended his complaint,
switching from Title I to Title HI liability. 974 The District argued that Title II
does not975 cover employment and again raised the release signed 976by
Bledsoe.
The district court entered summary judgment for the District.
963. See id.
964. Id. at 1318.
965. 133 F.3d 816 (11th Cir. 1998), reh'gdenied, 140 F.3d 1044 (11th Cir. 1999), and
cert. denied, Palm Beach Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. Bledsoe, 119 S. Ct. 72 (1998).

966.
967.
968.
969.

Id. at 818.
Id.
Id.
Id.

970. Bledsoe, 133 F.3d at 818-19.

971.
972.
973.
974.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

975. Bledsoe, 133 F.3d at 818-19.

976. Id. at 819.
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On appeal, two issues were raised: 1) the validity of the release, and 2)
whether Title I covers employment. 977 On both counts, the court reversed
the ruling of the district court.978 Relying on Supreme Court precedent
governing Title VII, the court made clear that an employee can waive his
"'cause of action under Title VII as part of a voluntary settlement
agreement' ' '979 if "'the employee's consent to the settlement was voluntary
and knowing.' ' '980 In this regard, the court set out from earlier Eleventh
Circuit precedent, the factors that weigh on whether a release is knowing and
voluntary:
[T]he plaintiff's education and business experience; the amount of
time the plaintiff considered the agreement before signing it; the
clarity of the agreement; the plaintiffs opportunity to consult with
an attorney; the employer's encouragement or discouragement of
consultation with an attorney; and the consideration given in
exchange for the waiver when compared
with the benefits to which
9 1
the employee was already entitled. 8
Applying these factors, the court ruled that a jury question was raised over
whether Bledsoe voluntarily and knowingly released his ADA claim.982
As for the second issue, whether Title II of the ADA covers
employment, the court relied on earlier Eleventh Circuit decisions implying
that Title II does indeed cover employment. 98 3 Moreover, the statutory
language of Title I, the Department of Justice's regulations, 984 and other
courts' position on this issue, weighed in favor of concluding that Title II
does cover employment.985 Title II bars public entities from excluding
disabled individuals from "services, programs, or activities. ' 6 The term
"public entity" expressly encompasses state and local government. 9 7 In
977. Id.
978. Id.
979. Id. (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 (1974)).
980. Bledsoe, 133 F.3d at 819 (quotingAlexander, 415 U.S. at 52 n.15).
981. Id. (quoting Puentes v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 86 F.3d 196, 198 (1lth Cir.
1996) (quoting Beadle v. City of Tampa, 42 F.3d 633, 635 (11 th Cir. 1995)).
982. Id.
983. Id. at 820 (citing Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, 112 F.3d 1522, 1528-29 (1lth
Cir. 1997); McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1073 (11 th Cir. 1996)).
984. 28 C.F.R. § 35.140(b)(1) (1998). "For purposes of [Title II], the requirements of
title I of the Act... apply to employment in any service, program, or activity conducted by a
public entity if that public entity is also subject to the jurisdiction of title I [i.e. employs fifteen
or more employees]." Id.
985. See Bledsoe, 133 F.3d at 820-25.
986. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994).
987. Bledsoe, 133 F.3d at 821 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)).
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sum, the weight of authority
•
988holds that Title II states a cause of action for
employment discrimination.
In Seaborn v. Florida Department of Corrections,9 plaintiffs, all
African-Americans employed by the Tallahassee Community Correctional
Center, suffered from a skin condition known as pseudofolliculitis barbae
("PFB") that made shaving painful. 990 The Correctional Center made an
exception to its "No Beard Policy" for plaintiffs' skin condition. 99' Even so,
plaintiffs alleged that they faced discrimination and were passed over for
promotions because they wore beards. 992 Plaintiffs sued their employer
under the ADA. 993 The district court ruled that plaintiffs' skin disorder did
not rise to the level of a disability under the ADA because PFB did not
substantially limit their ability to work.994
On appeal, the State of Florida asserted for the first time that it was
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from plaintiffs' ADA claims. 995
Because such a claim is jurisdictional, the court allowed Florida's immunity
defense but concluded that it was constrained by Eleventh Circuit precedent
that states lack Eleventh Amendment immunity from ADA claims. 996
Turning to the merits, the court sustained the lower court's ruling dismissing
plaintiffs' ADA claims on grounds that PFB did not substantially limit their
ability to work.997

988. Id. at 825.
989. 143 F.3d 1405 (1lth Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1038 (1999).
990. Id. at 1406.
991. Id.
992. Id.
993. Id.
994. Seaborn, 143 F.3d at 1406.
995. Id.
996. Id. at 1407 (citing Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1433 (11th
Cir. 1998)).
997. Id.
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